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Equal Protection After Romer v. Evans:
Implications for the Defense of Marriage
Act and Other Laws
by
KEVIN H. LEWIS*
[I]f the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare... desire to harm a
politicall, unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest.
Introduction
The strangely named2 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was passed
by the 104th Congress and signed into law by President Clinton on
September 21, 1996. 3 This law defines marriage as "only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife" 4 for the purposes
of federal rights and benefits, and also allows states to refuse to recognize
same-sex marriages performed in states which have legalized them.5 The
* B.S. 1992, Shepherd College; J.D. Candidate 1998, University of California, Hastings
College of the Law. I would like to thank Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat for his guidance and
helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996) (quoting United States Dep't of Agric.
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
2. Defense of Marriage Act supporters argued that they were "defending" the traditional
notions of morality by passing the act. See infra Part IV.B.2. Opponents argued that,
considering the Act's motivations, the name was ill-suited. Congressman Lewis of Georgia
stated during congressional debates: "I have known racism. I have known bigotry. This bill
stinks of the same fear, hatred and intolerance. It should not be called the Defense of Marriage
Act. It should be called the defense of mean-spirited bigots act." 142 Cong. Rec. H7444 (daily
ed. July 11, 1996) (sfatement of Rep. Lewis).
3. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1738C & 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996)). Critics of President Clinton and his decision to sign
the Defense of Marriage Act into law note that he did not sign the bill with fanfare in the Rose
Garden, but rather signed it in the White House quietly at midnight. See Peter Baker, President
Quietly Signs Law Aimed at Gay Marriages, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996, at A21.




DOMA obviously was an election year response to the possibility of
Hawaii legalizing same-sex marriages in 1997 or 1998.6 States have
traditionally been compelled by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
U.S. Constitution to recognize marriages performed in other states.7  If
Hawaii legalizes same-sex marriages, then the DOMA would forbid
Hawaiian same-sex couples from receiving federal rights and benefits to
which opposite-sex couples are now entitled, and it would also allow
other states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages performed in
Hawaii.
Most of the scholarly interest surrounding the DOMA has been
centered on whether other states will be forced by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to recognize same-sex unions performed in Hawaii.8 This
6. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67-68 (Haw. 1993) clarified, recons. denied, in
part, remanded, 74 Haw. 645, and recons. granted, in part, 875 P.2d 225 (1993) [hereinafter
Baehr 1] (holding that Hawaii statute restricting marriage to one male and one female is
presumed to be unconstitutional unless the state can show a compelling state interest for such sex
discrimination); Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996)
[hereinafter Baehr 11] (ruling on remand that banning same-sex marriages is sex discrimination).
The judge in Baehr II has suspended his ruling, which could pave the way for same-sex
marriages, until the Hawaii Supreme Court can review the appeal. See notes and accompanying
text, infra Part II.
The courts are not the only government institution involved in the same-sex marriage debate
in Hawaii. In an attempt to derail same-sex marriages, the Hawaii Legislature passed a bill in
April of 1997 that approved a sweeping package of rights and benefits to same-sex couples,
while at the same time putting a constitutional Amendment before the Hawaii voters in
November of 1998 that would allow the legislature to "reserve marriage to opposite-sex
couples." See Susan Essoyan, Hawaii Approves Benefits Package for Gay Couples, L.A.
TIMEs, Apr. 30, 1997, at A3.
Both supporters and opponents of same-sex marriage have mixed feelings about this
compromise. Opponents of same-sex marriage may eventually obtain their goal of preventing
legalized same-sex marriage (at least for the near future) if the constitutional amendment passes,
and so they have supported the bill. Id. Supporters of same-sex marriage are disappointed by
the possibility of a constitutional amendment because it would deny "first-class citizenship" to
gays and lesbians. Id. On the other hand, these same supporters are very happy with the
package of benefits that could be granted to gays and lesbians, which includes survivorship
rights, health benefits, property rights, and legal standing to sue for wrongful death and victims'
rights. Id. Insurance executives and other business leaders are already grumbling about the
potential for increased costs from the new law. See Jacob Kamhis, Reciprocal Benefits Open
Pandora's Box, PAC. Bus. NEws, June 2, 1997, at 1.
7. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.").
8. The writers of the House Committee report accompanying the DOMA spent a great
deal of time defending its constitutionality under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as did the
constitutional scholars who testified during Committee hearings on the bill. See Defense of
Marriage Act: Hearing Before the Subcommn. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 6-10 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2910-14. The Committee spent little time addressing whether the DOMA
might violate the Equal Protection Clause.
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constitutional provision has rarely been litigated and the DOMA's chances
of surviving a constitutional attack under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
is anyone's guess. However, recent developments in equal protection
jurisprudence may suggest other constitutional problems for the DOMA
outside of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
On May 20, 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down the Romer
v. Evans9 decision. In Romer, the Court struck down Colorado's state
constitutional amendment banning anti-discrimination protections for gays
and lesbians, holding that it violated the Equal Protection Clause.10 The
application of the Romer decision to future cases is unclear at this time
because the decision is ambiguously written and does not give much
guidance for future litigants and judges. However, Romer minimally
suggests that a law passed with nothing more than mere animus towards
gays and lesbians will not pass equal protection scrutiny.11
This then leads to the question of whether the constitutional
principles in the Romer decision could affect the DOMA or other
legislation that restricts the civil rights of gays and lesbians. It is the
author's assertion that many laws which negatively impact gays and
lesbians could be invalidated using the Romer v. Evans rational basis test.
This Note proposes a framework for understanding how courts might use
the rational basis test to invalidate prejudicial classifications against gays
Commentators have also focused on the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See Diane M.
Guillerman, Comment, The Defense of Marriage Act: The Latest Maneuver in the Continuing
Battle to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage, 34 Hous. L. REV. 425 (1997); Julie L. B. Johnson,
Comment, The Meaning of "General Laws": The Extent of Congress's Power Under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and the Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, 145 U. PA. L.
REV. 1611 (1997); Sondrea J. King, Note and Comment, Ya'll Cain't Do That Here: Will
Texas Recognize Same-Sex Marriages Validly Contracted in Other States?, 2 TEx. WESLEYAN
L. REV. 515 (1996); Mark Tanney, Note and Comment, The Defense of Marriage Act: A "Bare
Desire to Harm" an Unpopular Minority Cannot Constitute a Legitimate Governmental Interest,
19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 99 (1997).
9. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
10. Id. at 1627 (holding that Amendment 2 violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause). Colorado's Amendment 2 provided:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of
its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt
or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian,
or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise
be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
See COLO CONST. art. 2, § 30b (held unconstitutional by Romer v. Evans).
The Colorado Supreme Court had interpreted the Amendment to invalidate all existing laws
in the state or in any municipalities which had been enacted to protect gays and lesbians and to
preclude the enactment of any future such laws. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1284-85
(Colo. 1993).
11. SeeRomer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
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and lesbians, using the DOMA as an illustration of impermissible
legislation.
In analyzing a law such as the DOMA under the equal protection
principles set forth in Romer v. Evans, a court focuses on whether the law
was enacted for any legitimate legislative purpose. 12  After a careful
consideration of the motivations behind Section 3 of the DOMA, which
denies federal rights and benefits to same-sex couples duly married in a
state, this Note suggests that the law is based on irrational prejudice and is
unconstitutional. Part I gives an overview of traditional Supreme Court
equal protection doctrine. Part II reviews the scholarship and court
decisions addressing the constitutionality of same-sex marriage, including
the recent Hawaii case Baehr v. Lewin.13 In Part III, the Note examines
the Romer v. Evans decision to discern its significance for equal
protection. In Part IV, the Note scrutinizes the Congressional motivations
behind the DOMA to determine whether they meet the minimum
constitutional standards elucidated in Romer. To show that the
motivations behind the DOMA are not legitimate, it will be useful to
compare the legislation to anti-miscegenation statutes previously in force
in Southern states until the late 1960s.14 In doing so, the author hopes to
persuade the reader that the DOMA was motivated by an unconstitutional
bias towards gays and lesbians without any legitimate governmental
interest and, therefore, violates the Equal Protection Clause. Finally, the
Note concludes in Part V with some implications of the Romer decision
for other laws that discriminate against gays and lesbians.
I. Traditional Equal Protection Doctrine
Before Romer v. Evans, the U.S. Supreme Court had not taken a
position on the application of the Equal Protection Clause to laws
discriminating against gays and lesbians. Generally, the Equal Protection
Clause limits the ability of federal and state governments to classify
persons in the creation and application of laws. 5 The relevant text of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that "no state shall ... deny to any
12. See infra Parts III.A. and III.C.
13. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) clarified, recons. denied, in part, remanded, 74 Haw. 645,
and recons. granted, in part, 875 P.2d 225 (1993).
14. Anti-miscegenation statutes which banned interracial marriages dated from colonial
times and eventually were enacted by 38 states. See James Trosino, Note, American Wedding:
Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REv. 93, 97 (1993). Many of
these statutes were repealed as a result of the Civil War Amendments. Nonetheless, 31 states,
mostly in the South, still retained these laws as of World War II, and only 15 of those states had
repealed the laws as of 1966. See id. at 97-98.
15. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.2 (1995).
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person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 6 The
Clause does not forbid the government from making such classifications;
however, it does guarantee that if such lines are drawn, they may not be
based. on impermissible purposes or be used to arbitrarily burden a
particular group of individuals. 7
Under current constitutional doctrine, some judicial scrutiny is
warranted whenever a governmental action affects an,identifiable group.
Depending on the type of group affected by the legislation, traditional
equal protection principles suggest that a court will employ one of three
"tiers" of review in analyzing that legislation.1 8 The lowest level of equal
protection review is called rational basis review. Under this type of
review, the legislation is upheld if the legislature has drawn a
classification-aimed the law at a particular group-and that classification
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.' 9 This is a minimal level
of scrutiny, and courts almost always defer to legislative judgment and
uphold laws when using rational basis review. However, as will be
shown later, rational basis review does not always mean that the law is
immune from court scrutiny, especially if the law is based on nothing
more than "animus" or prejudice against a particular group.'
When a legislature draws classifications that affect certain
identifiable groups likely to be at risk in the ordinary political process,
courts will subject those laws to "heightened scrutiny."21 When a court
uses heightened scrutiny, it is more skeptical of legislation and makes
independent judgments on whether such legislation is constitutional. To
date, laws that classify on the basis of race, alienage, or national origin
are subject to the strictist scrutiny, and these laws are only constitutional
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Although the Fourteenth Amendment on its face only
prohibits states from denying equal protection to their citizens, the U.S. Supreme Court has held
that equal protection principles apply to the federal government as well as the states, based on
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) ("In
view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the States from maintaining racially
segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a
lesser duty on the Federal government.").
17. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 15, § 14.2.
18. See id.
19. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(discussing basic equal protection principles); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding a law favoring optometrists over opticians by assuming that the
law must be justified by health concerns).
20. See infra Part Il; see also Clebume, 473 U.S. 432 (invalidating a zoning ordinance
which, as applied, denied a permit to a group home for the mentally retarded); Uited States
Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (invalidating statute which denied food stamps
to households composed of unrelated jersons).
21. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Clebume, 473
U.S. at 440; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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when necessary to serve a compelling government interest.' This type of
review, strict scrutiny, has been characterized as "'strict' in theory and
fatal in fact."'3 The U.S. Supreme Court has also created an intermediate
level of review for laws that classify on the basis of gender or
citizenship.24 In order for the state to classify on the basis of these
categories, the legislation must be substantially related to the furtherance
of an important governmental interest.'
Some constitutional scholars contend that the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence contains one additional category, sometimes
called "rational basis with bite."26 Under this type of scrutiny, the Court,
while purporting to use the rational basis test, actually applies some form
of heightened scrutiny and invalidates the challenged law after a close
examination of the law's purpose and effects.27 These scholars believe
that the Court's use of the "rational basis with bite" standard is often a
signal that the designated class will soon be considered subject to
intermediate scrutiny.2" Not all scholars are in agreement that the
"rational basis with bite" category actually exists, and the Supreme Court
has never elucidated a specific test for this category.
Separate and distinct from its suspect classification doctrine, the
Court has also created a "fundamental rights" doctrine to protect against
legislation that infringes upon certain fundamental interests.' The list of
"fundamental rights" recognized by the Court today includes the right to
interstate travel,3" equal access to voting,31 and equal access to the
22. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 15, § 14.3.
23. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972). But see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) ("[W]e wish to
dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.'").
24. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
25. Id.
26. See Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any
Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987).
27. See id.
28. See id. The most famous instance where the Court elevated a designated class from
rational basis to intermediate review involved gender discrimination. Compare Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating a discriminatory gender classification using rational basis
review) with Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (admitting that intermediate
scrutiny should really be applied to gender classifications). See also Pettinga, supra note 26, at
803 (encouraging the Court to actually use intermediate scrutiny in "rational basis with bite"
situations).
29. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 15, § 11.4. This doctrine was founded in
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), where the Court invalidated a statute that required
sterilization of habitual criminals because the interests of "marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." Id. at 541.
30. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
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judiciary.3 2 It has never been suggested that sexual orientation should be
protected as a fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause, and
this Note does not consider the issue.
To date, the Supreme Court has not considered whether gays and
lesbians are a suspect class thus triggering heightened scrutiny, although
compelling arguments for such designation can be made. In deciding
whether to grant heightened scrutiny to a particular class, the Supreme
Court has stated that it examines the likelihood that the group in question
is subject to prejudice, the existence of past and present discrimination
against the group, and the group's lack of political power.33 Based on
these factors, some scholars argue that sexual orientation should be a
classification that is protected under an intermediate level of review.'
First of all, few would argue that gays and lesbians suffer no prejudice.
One only has to think of the movie and television images of gay men as
effeminate hairdressers for the idea that gays and lesbians are often
stereotyped. Advocates also point to the historical and current prejudices
that are suffered by gays and lesbians as an identifiable group. For
example, throughout American history, if a person disclosed that he or
she was gay or lesbian, that person suffered serious social harm including
loss of his or her job and social ostracization.35 Even today, gays and
lesbians who are public about their sexual orientation can be subject to
31. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (striking a
statute that required a person to own or lease property in the school district or have children in
school in order to vote in district election); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (holding that a state poll tax violated the equal protection clause).
32. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (requiring that indigent
defendants be provided counsel for appeals as of right); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(holding that the state must provide free trial transcripts to indigents appealing from criminal
convictions).
33. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442-45 (1985).
34. See John Charles Hayes, The Tradition of Prejudice Versus the Principle of Equality:
Homosexuals and Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny After Bowers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C. L.
REV. 375 (1990); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is
Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Eric A. Roberts, Heightened Scrutiny
Under the Equal Protection Clause: A Remedy to Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation,
42 DRAKE L. RaV. 485 (1993).
35. See Elvia Rosales Arriola, Sexual Identity and the Constitution: Homosexual Persons
as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 14 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 263, 278 (1992) (explaining that
being identified with homosexuality has been the basis of refusals to hire; the rain of careers;
undesirable military discharges; and denials of occupational licenses, the right to adopt, custody
of children and visitation rights, national security clearances, and the right to enter the country.)
See also High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. See. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1369
(N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Lesbians and
gay men have been the object of some of the deepest prejudice and hatred in American society.
Some people's hatred for gay people is so deep that many gay people face threat of physical
violence on American streets today.").
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discrimination and violence.36 A 1984 study of over 2,000 gays and
lesbians in eight U.S. cities found that almost all of the respondents had
experienced harassment, threats, or attacks, and more than one-fifth of
the men and one-tenth of the women had suffered physical violence
because of their sexual orientation.37 Gays and lesbians can be and often
are fired based on their sexual orientation.35 Further, in some states, gay
and lesbian parents may even lose their children in custody battles solely
because they are open about their sexual orientation.39 Finally, advocates
have argued that gays and lesbians are probably also "politically
powerless in the constitutionally relevant sense," primarily because the
prejudice and hostility directed at them hinders their ability to make
political alliances with other groups.' Also, gays and lesbians are able to
conceal their identity, enabling them to be anonymous and unrecognized
as a political group.4' An adequate estimate of gay and lesbian political
power has not even been made because of anonymity. This political
powerlessness is also exacerbated by situations where heterosexuals stand
up for gay rights and are then accused of being homosexual themselves.42
Although elevation of sexual orientation to a suspect class could
strike many laws aimed against gays and lesbians, this Note focuses on
the current Supreme Court rational basis equal protection jurisprudence
and the effects of Romer v. Evans.
36. Surveys indicate that over 90% of gays and lesbians have been victimized in some way
because of their orientation. RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS,
SOCIETY AND LAW 27-28 (1988). "Greater than one in five gay men and nearly one in ten
lesbians had been punched, hit, or kicked; a quarter of all gays [have] had objects thrown at
them." Id. at 28.
37. See Fernando J. Gutierrez, Gay and Lesbian: An Ethnic Identity Deserving Equal
Protection, 4 LAW & SEXUALITY 195, 242 (1994) (describing a study conducted by the National
Gay and Lesbian Task Force).
38. MOHR, supra note 36, at 30. Note that a minority of states have adopted laws
prohibiting discrimination in employment and housing based on sexual orientation, including
California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Vermont, Wisconsin, and the
District of Columbia. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW xxii-
xxiii (2d ed. 1997).
39. See Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981) (awarding custody of children
to father due to mother's homosexual relationship and cohabitation with another woman); S. v.
S., 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (granting father's motion for change of custody because
it is in the child's "best interests" not to grow up in lesbian mother's home).
40. Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1994)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Homosexuality] (discussing the fact that gays are "anonymous" and "not
tightly organized," which creates barriers for exerting political influence).
41. See id. (noting that homosexuals' ability to conceal their identity actually harms their
ability to exercise political power).
42. See id. at 8 n.24.
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H. Constitutionality of Same-Sex Marriage
As Part I of this Note outlined basic equal protection doctrine, this
Part provides the necessary background on cases and theories addressing
same-sex marriage, including Baehr v. Lewin, so that the reader may
fully understand the motivations behind the DOMA. Supporters of the
DOMA and many others who are opposed to granting equal rights to
gays and lesbians see same-sex marriage as the ultimate threat to their
"traditional" way of life.43 On the other hand, many advocates for gay
and lesbian rights see same-sex marriage as the best vehicle to lessen
prejudice against gays and lesbians." In legal scholarship, whether gays
and lesbians have the constitutional right to marry has been subject to
much consideration, with forceful arguments made in many different
directions.45
Under federal constitutional law, scholars have advocated the
possible constitutional right to same-sex marriage under the general right
to privacy, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause.'
This Note is limited to considering arguments for same-sex marriage
under the Equal Protection Clause, but the other constitutional arguments
should be briefly noted. Under the constitutional theory of the general
right to privacy, certain individual rights are considered fundamental and
cannot be abridged without the government supplying a compelling reason
to restrict that right.47 Under the Due Process Clause, certain personal
43. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 15-16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.A.N. 2905,
2919-20.
44. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, FROM
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 62-85 (1996) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, THE CASE];
but see infra note 193 (noting other gay advocates who do not feel that same-sex marriage is a
desirable goal for the gay community).
45. See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 34; Trosino, supra note 14; Kevin A. Zambrowicz,
Comment, "To Love and Honor All the Days of Your Life": A Constitutional Right to Same-Sex
Marriage.', 43 CATH. U. L. REv. 907 (1994). See also Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of
Constitutional Claims for Same-Se Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1 (1996) (arguing that there
is no equal protection or other constitutional right to same-sex marriage). Wardle notes that out
of seventy-two law review articles, notes, comments, and essays focusing on same-sex marriage,
only a handful of authors have taken the position that same-sex marriage is not constitutionally
mandated. Id. at 18-20.
46. See generally SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 96-98 (Harvard Law Review ed.,
1990) (arguing that at least these three constitutional principles support the right of same-sex
couples to marry); Christine Jax, Same-Sex Marriage-Why Not?, 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 461
(1995) (arguing that various constitutional and other legal principles along with societal mores
require the recognition of same-sex marriage as a fundamental right).
47. Justice Douglas first enunciated the general right to privacy in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 15, § 11.4.
Originally, the Supreme Court did not locate the general right to privacy in a specific
constitutional provision, although more recently the Court has determined that this right flows
from the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of
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rights are deemed to be "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" and are protected from government interference.48 These
fundamental rights, often called "substantive due process rights,, 49 may
only be abridged in furtherance of a compelling state interest and by
means necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state
interest.
50
The argument for same-sex marriage based on the general right to
privacy or the Due Process Clause has probably been foreclosed by
Bowers v. Hardwick,5' where the Supreme Court held that there is no
fundamental privacy right to engage in homosexual sodomy. Having
refused to find a fundamental right to homosexual sodomy, it seems
highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will elevate the more controversial
idea of same-sex marriage to a fundamental right. 2 The justices have
argued that Due Process rights are based on rights "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition, 53 and indeed there is little evidence of any
historical practice of same-sex marriages performed in this country. 4
The Supreme Court has not identified a new fundamental right under the
Due Process Clause since it decided Roe v. Wade, and there are no
indications that an increasingly conservative court will expand the
substantive due process doctrine.
Health, 457 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that a competent adult has a fundamental right to refuse
unwarranted medical procedures); Moore v. East Cleveland 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that
states may not enact a zoning ordinance which limits the occupancy of a unit to a single family
because this burdens the fundamental right of relatives to live together); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (holding that a woman's fundamental right to abortion was located in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause).
48. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
49. For a good article outlining the substantive due process doctrine while at the same time
criticizing it, see John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA.
L. REv. 493 (1997). Not all members of the Supreme Court support the continued use of this
doctrine. The most vocal critic of substantive due process is Justice Scalia. See United States v.
Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2026 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (calling the doctrine of
substantive due process "an oxymoron").
50. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
51. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). But see infra notes 139-54 and accompanying text (arguing that
Bowers does not close the door to courts invalidating laws preventing same-sex marriages
because the principles behind substantive due process are not transferable to equal protection).
52. Professor Wardle has opined that Bowers "unequivocally rejected the claim that the
Constitution or the Supreme Court's interpretation of any of its provisions shelters any right to
engage in, or provides any special protection for, homosexual behavior." Wardle, supra note
45, at 35. This reading is extremely broad, but she is probably right that Bowers has foreclosed
any arguments that any same-sex behavior is protected by the Due Process Clause.
53. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194; see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)
(Scalia, J.,) (arguing that due process rights should only be defined by looking to the most
specific level at which a relevant historical tradition can be identified).
54. Although the idea of same-sex marriage is a recent phenomenon in this country, other
cultures have nurtured such relationships in the past. See infra notes 212-19 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 49
Although scholars have published many books and articles on the
subject of same-sex marriage, in the courtroom this issue has generated
much less of a paper trail. While advocates make forceful theoretical
arguments that gays and lesbians should have a constitutional right to
same-sex marriage, their arguments have generally fallen on deaf ears.
Early cases suggest that courts were simply dumbfounded at the
suggestion that the state could not prohibit same-sex marriage. More
recently, with Baehr v. Lewin, courts are reassessing their earlier
condemnation of same-sex marriage.
Although the United States Supreme Court has not considered the
issue, several state supreme courts in the 1970s considered challenges to
laws or administrative decisions denying same-sex couples the right to
marry. In Jones v. Hallahan,55 two women sued to compel a Kentucky
county clerk to issue them a marriage license. After finding that the state
marriage statute did not expressly prohibit same-sex marriages, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals simply consulted a dictionary and concluded
that marriage is defined as the "union of a man and a woman. "56 Because
of this definition, the two women were not permitted to marry even
though the statute did not specifically bar the union.
Another initial case challenging the prohibition on same-sex
marriages was Baker v. Nelson. In that case, Richard Baker and James
McConnell applied for a marriage license in a Minnesota courthouse and
were denied the license because both applicants were of the same sex.5"
They challenged this denial, but the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected
their claim, also basing its decision on the traditional definition of
marriage as the union between one man and one woman. 59  The
Minnesota court buttressed this holding by noting that procreation and
child-rearing are indispensable elements of the marriage institution.'
The rationale underlying the Baker decision was also used by the
Washington Court of Appeals in Singer v. Hara.P In denying the
marriage application of the plaintiffs, two men, the court relied upon the
intimate relationship between marriage, procreation, and child-rearing.62
55. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
56. Id. at 589.
57. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 186 ("IThe present [Minnesota] statute is replete with words of heterosexual
import such as 'husband and wife' and 'bride and groom.'").
60. Id. ("The institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the
procreation and rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis."). Cf.
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (holding that the right to marry is a fundamental
right, in part based on the concepts of child-rearing and procreation).
61. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
62. Id. at 1195.
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The court also rejected the plaintiff's equal protection challenge, holding
that it is not gender discrimination when "all same-sex marriages are
deemed illegal by the state . . . since there is no gender discrimination so
long as marriage licenses are denied equally to both male and female
pairs. " ' In other words, because males and females both are precluded
from marrying partners of the same sex, there is no sex discrimination.
This argument also has a corollary: the right to marry is not denied to the
individuals but rather to the same-sex couple, because each individual
could just marry a partner of the opposite sex.
Until 1993, no court had deviated from these traditional arguments
that same-sex marriage can be defined away using a dictionary, that
procreation and child-rearing are not served by same-sex partners, and
that denying same-sex marriages implicates no equal protection concerns
since men can always marry women and vice-versa. It is interesting that
none of the state statutes involved in Hallahan, Baker, or Singer expressly
limited marriage to heterosexual couples, nor did the statutes prohibit
same-sex marriage.6' However, these gender-neutral statutes were
ordinarily construed by courts to apply only to heterosexual marriages.
The Hawaii case of Baehr v. Lewin challenged many of the assumptions
behind these traditional arguments and also awoke the rest of the nation to
the reality that same-sex marriages might be closer than anyone had
previously believed.
On May 1, 1991, six plaintiffs, including Nina Baehr, filed a
complaint in the Hawaii Circuit Court challenging the constitutionality of
the Hawaii marriage statute. 65 The trial court granted the state's motion
for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the action for failure to state
a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. 66 On appeal to the
63. Id. at 1191. Note that essentially the same argument was used by the State of Virginia
in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967), and was discredited by the U.S. Supreme Court in
that case. Id. at 11. See discussion infra Part IV. In Singer, the plaintiffs also sought
protection under Washington's Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). The Singer court dismissed
this challenge by determining that the same-sex couples were not being denied a marriage license
based on sex discrimination, but rather "because of the nature of marriage itself." Singer, 522
P.2d at 1196.
64. See Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d at 589 (noting that the Kentucky statutes do not define the
term "marriage"); Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 185-86 (noting that the Minnesota marriage laws do
not expressly prohibit same-sex marriage). In Singer, the applicable statute provided that:
Marriage is a civil contract which may be entered into by persons of the age of
eighteen years, who are otherwise capable: Provided, That every marriage entered
into in which either party shall not have attained the age of seventeen years shall be
void except where this section has been waived by a superior court judge of the county
in which the female resides on a showing of necessity.
Singer, 522 P.2d at 1189 n.2 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (1970)).
65. Baehr 1, 852 P.2d at 48-49. The Hawaii marriage statute can be found at HAw. REv.
STAT. § 572-1 (1985).
66. Baehr I, 852 P.2d at 52.
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Hawaii Supreme Court, the plaintiffs claimed that the statute violated the
Hawaii constitutional rights to privacy, due process, and equal
protection.' The Hawaii Supreme Court refused to adopt the traditional
arguments from the older cases described above. After rejecting the
plaintiffs' privacy and due process claims,68 the Hawaii Supreme Court
concluded that the circuit court's dismissal "runs aground on the shoals of
the Hawaii Constitution's equal protection clause," vacated the judgment,
and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings.'
On remand, the circuit court concluded that the sex-based classification
in the Hawaii marriage statute was unconstitutional and enjoined the state
from denying marriage licenses to the couples involved in the litigation,
thus potentially paving the way for legalized same-sex marriage in the
state of Hawaii.
One primary reason for the Hawaii Supreme Court's Baehr v. Lewin
decision is the state's expanded equal protection clause. The more
elaborate Hawaii equal protection clause provides that "no person
shall.., be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the
enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the
exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or ancestry."71 By
comparison, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution merely
provides that "no state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."' Unlike the federal constitution,
Hawaii's equal protection clause specifically mentions sex discrimination
in its provisions. Because of this broadened equal protection clause, the
Hawaii Supreme Court held that classifications based on sex are subject to
the enhanced form of judicial review called strict scrutiny, rather than the
lesser intermediate scrutiny required by the federal constitution.73 Under
strict scrutiny, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the statute was
presumptively unconstitutional unless upon remand the state could show a
compelling state interest narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary
67. Id. at 50.
68. Id. at 54-57. Consideration of the privacy and due process claims in Baehr I is beyond
the scope of this Note. For a good summary of these and the other constitutional issues involved
in Baehr I, along with prior same-sex marriage decisions, see Anthony C. Infanti, Baehr v.
Lewin: A Step in the Right Direction for Gay Rights?, 4 LAW & SEXUALITY 1 (1994).
69. Baehr 1, 852 P.2d at 54.
70. Baehr H, 1996 WL 694235, at *21-22. This decision has been appealed to the Hawaii
Supreme Court for review, which is tentatively scheduled to issue a decision in 1998. For a
discussion of developments in the Hawaii legislature since Baehr II that could eliminate the
potential right to same-sex marriage in Hawaii, see supra note 6.
71. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
73. Baehr 1, 852 P.2d at 66-67. For more a more detailed explanation of the differences




abridgments of the litigants' constitutional rights.74 This is a very high
burden for a state to meet and is usually fatal to the law.75
The second primary reason for the Baehr v. Lewin decision is the
type of legal reasoning that the Hawaii Supreme Court used in its
decision. State courts in the 1970s had held that the right to marry was
not denied to the gay and lesbian individuals, but rather that the right was
merely denied to the same-sex couple-individuals were not discriminated
against because they could always marry a partner of the opposite sex.76
According to these courts, since there was no discrimination against gay
and lesbian individuals, there was no equal protection violation. 7 Recall
also their other argument that denial of same-sex marriage was not sex
discrimination because marriage licenses were denied equally to both male
and female pairs.7 The Baehr v. Lewin court expressly rejected these
arguments as an "exercise in tortured and conclusory sophistry"79 and
concluded that prohibiting same-sex marriage is discrimination on the
basis of sex." The court held that, because the marriage statute "restricts
the marital relation to a male and a female," it "denies same-sex couples
access to the marital status and its concomitant rights and benefits."81
What are the implications of the Baehr v. Lewin decision to equal
protection jurisprudence in federal and state courts? Since the Hawaii
court was construing the Hawaii constitution, the Baehr decision has no
direct implication for the U.S. Constitution. 2 Although other states are
not bound by the Hawaii decision, states with similar equal protection
clauses may be persuaded by the Hawaii court's legal reasoning when
construing their own constitutions. First and foremost, the case is
important because a state supreme court has rejected the "traditional"
arguments behind the Hallahan, Baker, and Singer decisions of the
1970s. Baehr v. Lewin is the first case to apply a form of heightened
equal protection scrutiny to a state statute that was construed to deny
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Secondarily, courts in other states
with constitutional provisions similar to the Hawaii equal protection clause
may be more likely to adopt the Baehr v. Lewin decision's rationale to
74. Baehr 1, 852 P.2d at 66-67.
75. See supra Part I.
76. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
79. Baehr 1, 852 P.2d at 63.
80. Id. at 59.
81. Id. at 60.
82. The Hawaii decision may help to persuade the Supreme Court justices that sexual
orientation should become a suspect class. Two former Supreme Court justices once adhered to
this view. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brennan,
J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
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scrutinize legislation which discriminates against gays and lesbians in
other contexts.
I. Romer v. Evans
Romer v. Evans could potentially have a large impact on laws that
negatively impact gays and lesbians. The outcome of the Romer decision
is widely known; the more difficult task is identifying the rationale that
the Court used in its decision and determining the impact of the decision
on future cases. This Part of the Note will attempt to make sense of the
majority opinion, which is short but ambiguous.
A. The Decision: A Minimalist Interpretation
In 1992, Colorado voters ratified an amendment to the state
constitution, Amendment 2, that prohibited the state or its municipalities
from enacting laws that protect gays and lesbians from discrimination. 3
Amendment 2 effectively erased many protections for gays and lesbians
because the state and some Colorado municipalities had already enacted
various anti-discrimination ordinances.8 4 Shortly after its enactment, the
Colorado Supreme Court enjoined the state from enforcing Amendment 2,
holding that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by depriving gays and lesbians of the fundamental right to
participate equally in the political process.' The Colorado Supreme
Court based its decision on U.S. Supreme Court precedent concerning the
right to vote, eligibility of candidates for election, reapportionment, and
voter initiatives that prohibit local governments from enacting certain
types of legislation.86 Primarily, the Colorado court relied on Hunter v.
Erickson, 7 the case in which the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an
amendment to a city charter that required an election before any
ordinance "dealing with racial, religious, or ancestral discrimination in
housing" could take effect.88 Although Amendment 2 did not involve
race, religious, or ancestral discrimination, the Colorado court used
83. See CoLO. CoNsT. art. 2, § 30b (held unconstitutional by Romer v. Evans).
84. See CoLO. REv. STAT. § 10-3-1104, (I)(VIII) (1992 Supp.) (forbidding health
insurance providers from determining insurability and premiums based on sexual orientation);
ASPEN, COLO., MUN. CODE § 13-98 (1977) (prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation in employment, housing, and public accommodations); BOULDER, CoLO., REV.
CODE §§ 12-1-2 to -4 (1987) (prohibiting similar types of discrimination); DENvER CoLO.,
REV. MUN. CODE art IV, §§ 28-91-116 (1991) (prohibiting similar types of discrimination).
85. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1285-86 (Colo. 1993).
86. See id. at 1277-82 (detailing the various Court decisions protecting these fundamental
rights, and their application to Amendment 2).
87. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
88. See id. at 392-93.
November 19971
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Hunter's reasoning and language to support the fundamental right of gays
and lesbians to participate equally in the political process. s9
The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept the Colorado court's
rationale for its decision in Romer v. Evans but crafted its own rationale
for holding the Amendment unconstitutional. 90 The Court considered
arguments by the plaintiffs that heightened scrutiny should apply to gays
and lesbians, including the argument that Amendment 2 was directed
towards gays and lesbians as a discrete and insular minority therefore
warranting heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
Although many commentators support this principle, 91 none of the courts
throughout the Romer litigation accepted this argument. The U.S.
Supreme Court apparently did not consider whether gays and lesbians are
considered a suspect or quasi-suspect class, but rather claimed to be
applying the rational basis standard instead.' Even under that supposedly
lenient standard, however, the Court concluded that the law did not pass
muster, finding that Amendment 2 was based purely on animus against
homosexuals .93
Some scholars have contended that although the Romer decision itself
does not identify sexual orientation as a quasi-suspect class, it is the first
step on the road towards that end. 94 Regardless of what Romer may
indicate about the Court's future direction towards recognizing sexual
orientation as a suspect class, Romer must have its own doctrinal
significance, especially since the lower courts will have to use this
decision in future cases. As an initial matter, Romer recognizes that gays
and lesbians are a distinct group subject to some protection from
legislation like Colorado's Amendment 2. More importantly, Romer
stands for the broader proposition that anti-gay bias cannot be a legitimate
89. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d at 1279 (noting that Hunter "speaks to concerns which
are broader than the repugnancy of racial discrimination alone").
90. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1624 (1996) (noting that the Court was
affirming "on a rationale different from that adopted by the state supreme court"). Why did the
U.S. Supreme Court not accept the Colorado Court's rationale? Perhaps the most
straightforward and easiest way for the Supreme Court to dispense with the Amendment 2
controversy was to use rational basis scrutiny rather than the fundamental rights approach taken
by the Colorado Supreme Court.
91. See supra note 34.
92. Although the Court never explicitly states that it is using the rational basis test, it
makes mention of this test in its decision. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627 ("[I]f a law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative
classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end."). A lingering
question is why didn't the court make mention of heightened scrutiny? Perhaps the easiest
explanation is that the Court did not need heightened scrutiny to invalidate Amendment 2.
93. Id. at 1627.
94. See, e.g., Tobias Barrington Wolff, Case Note, Principled Silence: Romer v. Evans,
106 YALE L.J. 247, 250-52 (1996) (arguing that the majority opinion foreshadows future
heightened scrutiny of anti-gay legislation).
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motivation for legislation. That is, legislation cannot be motivated by
pure "animosity."' In Justice Kennedy's words, the Court must "ensure
that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the
group burdened by the law." 96 The Amendment created a "classification
of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection
Clause does not permit. " 97  Doctrinally, this means that legislation
specifically denying certain rights to gays and lesbians must have some
legitimate motivation other than animosity towards the class.
The State of Colorado advanced several arguments attempting to
show that Amendment 2 was motivated by legitimate reasons. The
primary rationale advanced by the state was that Amendment 2 was
created out of respect for citizens who did not wish to associate with gays
and lesbians, especially landlords and employers who had religious or
other moral objections to homosexuality. 9' A secondary reason put
forward by the state was that Amendment 2 would conserve state money
that could be used to fight discrimination against other identifiable
groups. 99  The Court dismissed these concerns as not worthy of
consideration, stating that "[t]he breadth of the Amendment is so far
removed from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to
credit them.""° Rather than directly rebutting these state interests, the
Court apparently felt that Amendment 2 "so far overstepped any
legitimate state interest that it 'confound[ed]' the process of finding a
rational relationship and compelled the conclusion that the proffered
interests were merely a pretext for anti-gay sentiment." 01 In essence, the
Court was saying that it simply did not believe that these were the real
purposes behind the legislation, and if these were the actual reasons, the
law should have been more narrowly drawn to reflect these concerns.
The State of Colorado also contended that Amendment 2 merely
denied "special rights" to gay people, and that it was therefore a
legitimate piece of "neutralizing" legislation to put gays and lesbians in
95. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627 ("IT]he amendment seems inexplicable by anything but
animus towards the class that it affects .... ").
96. Mi. at 1627-28 (citing United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("If the adverse impact on the disfavored class is an apparent
aim of the legislature, its impartiality would be suspect.")).
97. Id. at 1629.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. Interestingly, the Court did not expressly state that these were illegitimate reasons
for the legislation; however, the opinion later mentions that "[w]e cannot say that Amendment 2
is directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective." Id.
101. Katherine M. Hamill, Comment, Romer v. Evans: Dulling the Equal Protection Gloss
on Bowers v. Hardwick, 77 B.U. L. REv. 655, 673-74 (1997) (quoting Romer, 116 S. Ct. at
1628).
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the same position as all other persons.'O° Justice Kennedy rejected this
argument, stating that the Amendment withdraws specific legal
protections against discrimination from gays and lesbians, but not from
any other group; and it even forbids reinstatement of anti-discrimination
laws.'0 3 Thus, the law imposed a "special disability" on gays and
lesbians, rather than eliminating "special rights" as Amendment 2's
backers had claimed.'04
A secondary point made by the Court involved the inherent
strangeness of the particular legislation under review."°5 The Court noted
that it had never before seen a piece of legislation that had no other real
purpose but to deny rights and protections to gays and lesbians.l°6 Justice
Kennedy stated that "laws singling out a certain class of citizens for
disfavored legal status or general hardships are rare" and that "[i]t is not
within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort. " 1°7 Thus,
legislation that advances a legitimate interest but happens to disadvantage
a particular group may be constitutional, but laws that single out gays and
lesbians (or any other group, for that matter) to deny them rights or
privileges without a legitimate interest are probably not constitutional.
B. Alternative Interpretations of Romer: The Anticaste Principle
and the Pariah Principle
Alternatively, some argue that Romer is not really a part of
traditional rational basis equal protection doctrine; rather it is more of a
moral statement that legislatures may not legislate a group to "second-
class" citizenship. Professor Cass Sunstein originated this concept in a
1994 article, labeling it the "anticaste principle." 10 8  More recently,
Professors Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry have linked Romer v. Evans
to this concept, which they have renamed the "pariah principle."" °
Although there are some differences between the anticaste principle and
the pariah principle, the ideas share many similarities.
102. Roner, 116 S. Ct. at 1624.
103. Id. at 1625.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1627 ("[Tlhe amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group.").
106. Id. at 1628 ("The... disqualification of a class of persons from the right to seek
specific protection from the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence.").
107. Id.
108. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Anticaste]; see also Sunstein, Homosexuality, supra note 40, at 12-16.
109. See Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT.
257 (1996).
[Vol. 49
The basic similarity between the two conceptions is the idea that
legislatures should not disadvantage particular classes to make one group
"second-class citizens" based on a "morally irrelevant characteristic."" 0
Perhaps this principle evolved from Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson, where he stated:
"There is no caste here .... We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our
people above all other peoples. But it is difficult to reconcile that boast
with a state of the law which, practically, puts the brand of servitude
and degradation upon a large class of our fellow-citizens, or equals
before the law.""'
Regardless of its origination, the basic principle is that legislation that
singles out one particular group of people and brands them as inferior is
impermissible.
As described by its creator, Professor Sunstein, the anticaste
principle is not a part of past or present equal protection jurisprudence
and is different from the traditional use of "suspect classes."" 2 Rather, it
is an alternate theory for understanding the concept of equality in the
Constitution. Professor Sunstein suggests that instead of invoking the
traditional equal protection analysis, the relevant question that a court or
legislature should ask is "[d]oes the law. . . in question contribute to the
maintenance of second-class citizenship, or lower-caste status" for the
protected group?1 . Whereas traditional equal protection theory examines
the considerations that lie behind laws, the anticaste principle is merely
designed to protect against second-class status for particular social
groups." 4 Rather than focusing on the motivations or purposes behind
particular laws, Professor Sunstein's theory looks to the practical effect of
the legislation on the affected groups. Traditional theory and the anticaste
principle are conceptually different, but their results overlap in many
instances. For example, under current constitutional doctrine, a law
prohibiting African-Americans from marrying would be unconstitutional
because it has no legitimate purpose," 5 although it would also be invalid
under Sunstein's anticaste principle because the law would work to make
African-Americans "second-class citizens."
110. See Sunstein, Anticaste, supra note 108, at 2429.
111. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Professor
Sunstein claims that the anticaste principle is older than the Civil War, and that it grew "out of
the original rejection of the monarchical legacy and the explicit constitutional ban on titles of
nobility." Sunstein, Anticaste, supra note 108, at 2428-29.
112. See Sunstein, Anticaste, supra note 108, at 2441. Professor Sunstein also claims that
his anticaste principle is a philosophy that is better implemented by the legislative or executive
branches than the courts. See id. at 2412.
113. Id. at 2429.
114. See id. at 2441.
115. In fact, similar laws were invalidated by the Supreme Court using traditional equal
protection analysis in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See infra Part IV.
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Most relevant to this Note, Professor Sunstein claims that his theory
only applies to groups which are discriminated against based on a highly
visible characteristic, primarily race and gender." 6  Sunstein feels that
gays and lesbians are not covered under his anticaste principle, because,
even though discrimination against them is illegitimate, they have no
highly visible characteristics.'17 Consequently, Colorado's Amendment 2
might not be unconstitutional under Sunstein's anticaste principle." 8
Unlike Sunstein's anticaste principle, Farber and Sherry's pariah
principle can be applied to laws aimed at gays and lesbians. In their
opinion, the Constitution prevents lawmakers from legislating any group
to outcast status, whether or not that group has identifiable or highly
visible characteristics." 9  These commentators feel that the pariah
principle has more relevance if the trait in question is immutable and the
group is not responsible for their status, but immutability is not
mandatory."o Although sexual orientation cannot be identified by looking
at a person, there is increasing evidence that sexual orientation is an
immutable personal characteristic and is genetically determined.' Under
Farber and Sherry's theory, then, gays and lesbians are a group that
cannot be relegated to outcast status. They state that "[w]hether the
badge of inferiority is a black skin, or a yellow star, or a pink triangle,
the pariah principle forbids the government from relegating any class of
citizens to the status of untouchables."1
While Sunstein's idea is only his own personal theory about how
equal protection jurisprudence could be reformulated, Farber and Sherry
argue that the pariah principle is a lively part of current and historical
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Farber and Sherry trace the application of
the pariah principle throughout the Court's history and conclude that
116. See Sunstein, Anticaste, supra note 108, at 2432-33.
117. See id. at 2433 n.74. Professor Sunstein feels that gays and lesbians might be
protected by gender-based discrimination even though the anticaste principle does not
specifically protect them as a social group. See id.
118. Sunstein's article proposing the anticaste principle was written in 1994, before the
Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Romer v. Evans, so he has not had the opportunity to
comment on the relationship between Romer and his theory. Because gays and lesbians are not
protected under his theory, it can be assumed that Amendment 2, a law directed at them, would
not be unconstitutional.
119. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 109, at 273. Farber and Sherry do not overtly
criticize Sunstein's ideas in their article and call his work an "ambitious reconceptualization of
existing equal protection doctrine"; however, they do note that Sunstein's definition of caste
might paradoxically exclude the Indian untouchable caste from protection. Id.
120. See id. at 268-69.
121. See Stephen Zamansky, Colorado's Amendment 2 and Homosexuals' Right to Equal
Protection of the Law, 35 B.C. L. REV. 221, 241-44 (1993) (discussing scientific evidence about
the immutability of homosexuality, including the idea that homosexual orientation is a trait
which is evident early in life, is not freely chosen, and cannot be changed).
122. Farber & Sherry, supra note 109, at 275.
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Romer v. Evans was the latest in a narrow line of cases evidencing the
pariah principle." In Farber and Sherry's opinion, the Court uses the
pariah principle in case where it strikes offensive legislation using rational
basis review and claims that the state had no legitimate objective for the
legislation.'24
According to Farber and Sherry, the Court mentions something about
caste-based legislation being repulsive to the Equal Protection Clause."z
Often, justices applying the pariah principle rely on a quote by Senator
Howard, who defended the proposed Fourteenth Amendment on the floor
of the Senate by stating that its purpose was to "abolish all class
legislation... and [do] away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of
persons to a code not applicable to another."126 For example, in Plyler v.
Doe, 7 the Court struck down a Texas law which prevented illegal alien
children from attending public schools, stating that "[tihe Equal
Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of
all caste-based ... legislation."" According to Farber and Sherry, the
pariah principle is not limited to Equal Protection cases. It has been
recognized in a wide variety of cases, including both bill of attainder and
cruel and unusual punishment cases. 
129
Why do Farber and Sherry feel that the Romer decision exemplifies
the pariah principle? They note that key parts of the opinion rely on other
cases which have invoked the pariah principle to strike unconstitutional
legislation. In one of the most important statements in Romer, Justice
Kennedy quotes United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno3 ' for
the language, "[I]f the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the
laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a
bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest."' In Moreno, the Court refused to
treat Congress' desire to exclude "hippie communes" from the federal
food stamp program as a legitimate objective.' Moreno involved a
typical example of caste legislation. The statute excluded households
123. See id. at 275-82.
124. See id. at 258.
125. See id.
126. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). Examples of cases in which the
Court has quoted Senator Howard include Plyler v. Doe, 457, U.S. 202, 214-15 (1982), Jones
v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 424 n.23 (1981), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 600 (1964)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
127. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
128. Id. at 213.
129. Farber & Sherry, supra note 109, at 269.
130. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
131. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (quoting United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
132. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534-35.
November 1997] EQUAL PROTECTION
containing unrelated individuals from receiving benefits.133 While using
traditional rational basis review, the Court stated that the legislation
created two classes of citizens: related individuals living in a household
who received benefits and unrelated individuals who were denied
assistance.134  Dismissing the potentially legitimate reasons for the
legislation, 135 the Court invalidated the law because it was created merely
with animus towards a particular group-unrelated persons living in the
same household. 1
36
Neither the anticaste principle nor the pariah principle are in conflict
with the minimalist or traditional interpretation of the Romer decision
described above. Under traditional rational basis scrutiny, the Court must
still determine that the purposes or ends of the legislation are
permissible. 137 Any legislation based on prejudice or some other irrational
purpose does not meet this minimal level of scrutiny.138 Certainly, if the
purpose of the legislation was to make a particular group "second-class
citizens" or to prevent the group from protecting itself from
discrimination, the Court would invalidate this legislation as based on
impermissible purposes. According to traditional equal protection
doctrine, this explains the result in cases such as Moreno and Romer. The
focus of the anticaste principle and the pariah principle is also on whether
the ends of legislation are permissible-whether the legislature is
attempting to relegate a group to "second-class" citizenship. Thus, laws
with prejudicial purposes will not survive scrutiny under either
interpretation.
133. See id. at 529 (describing the unconstitutional statute).
134. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529.
135. Interestingly, one of the legitimate reasons originally advanced by the government in
the Moreno litigation was that the legislation fostered "morality." See id. at 535. Although the
government dropped the argument after it was rejected by the District Court, the Supreme Court
noted its disapproval of this governmental interest. See id. Compare this with one of the
reasons for the DOMA put forth by its Congressional supporters, that the DOMA protects
"traditional morality." See infra Part IV.B.2. Moreno suggests that this may never be a
legitimate governmental interest. See 413 U.S. at 535. However, the makeup of the Court has
certainly changed since 1973 and perhaps the current Court may be more receptive to "morality"
arguments. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), Justice White endorses morality as a
legitimate government interest. Id. at 196. But see Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628-29 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the Romer majority implicitly rejects morality as a legitimate state
interest).
136. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534-38.
137. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 15, § 14.2.
138. See, e.g., Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628; Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
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C. A Note About Bowers v. Hardwick
139
In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court decided its first case dealing with
gay rights, Bowers v. Hardwick. In a five to four decision, the majority
held that consensual homosexual sodomy was not protected by the
constitutional right to privacy found in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 14  The Georgia criminal statute at issue
prohibited consensual sodomy between all persons, although the State
only applied the law to gays and lesbians. 41 Justice White's majority
opinion held that the Court could not recognize a privacy right for
homosexual sodomy, in part because of the long history of moral
disapproval of gays and lesbians. 42 According to the Court, protection of
rights under the Due Process Clause is limited to rights "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition." 43  The Court's earlier holdings had extended privacy rights
for family life, marriage, contraception, and abortion." However,
because there was no historical approval of homosexual sodomy, the
majority felt that it could not be protected under the Due Process
Clause.' 45
After Bowers, it appeared that gays and lesbians would never have
any sort of constitutional protection, especially given Chief Justice
Burger's scathing concurrence. Burger quoted Blackstone's ancient
words that sodomy was "the infamous crime against nature .... an of-
fense of deeper malignity than rape, a heinous act the very mention of
which is a disgrace to human nature." 146 Burger's bluster did not end
with Blackstone's quotes, and he concluded that "[t]o hold that the act of
139. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For a good discussion of the history of Bowers along with an
analysis of its meaning, see Anne E. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values:
Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988).
140. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-88. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which
shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
141. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-88.
142. Id. at 196 ("The law.., is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws
representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the
courts will be very busy indeed.").
143. Id. at 191-92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) and Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
144. See id. at 190-91 (noting all of the relevant cases, concluding that "none of the rights
announced in those cases bears any resemblance" to the right to engage in homosexual sodomy).
145. See id.
146. Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would
be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching. "147
Some lower courts have used Bowers to infer that, because the
Supreme Court allowed Georgia to criminalize homosexual sodomy, gays
and lesbians deserve no constitutional protection, even under the Equal
Protection Clause. 148  However, as implicitly recognized by the Romer
court, this misinterprets the holding of Bowers, which was a decision
based on the Due Process, not the Equal Protection, Clause. The litigants
in Bowers attempted to constitutionally enshrine homosexual conduct as
activity which is protected under substantive due process, and the Court
refused to accept that argument. Justice White felt that a decision
protecting homosexual sodomy under the Due Process Clause would
invariably lead to the constitutional protection of adultery and incest, and
he was unwilling to venture down the constitutional slippery slope. 149 The
Supreme Court explicitly stated in Bowers that its Due Process Clause
holding did not affect principles of equal protection because the equal
protection issue was not litigated. 50
As recognized by Professor Cass Sunstein, the principles that are
protected under the Due Process Clause are not the same principles
protected under the Equal Protection Clause; each constitutional principle
must be considered independently. 5' In Bowers, the Court refused to
protect homosexual conduct as a fundamental right, but the Court did not
consider whether gays and lesbians as a disadvantaged group should be
protected from discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. These
ideas are very different; essentially, prohibiting conduct is distinct from
legislating against a group because of their status.'52 Substantive due
process casts the conduct as the right to be protected, while equal
147. Id.
148. See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (denying an equal protection
challenge to the FBI's policy of considering homosexual conduct a 'significant' and often
dispositive factor in employment decisions). Justice Scalia uses this same reasoning in his
dissent in Romer v. Evans. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
149. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195-96. But see id. at 209 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing homosexual sodomy from adultery because adultery injures third persons, in
particular spouses and children of people engaging in extracurricular affairs, and distinguishing
incest because it is never truly consensual because of the nature of family relationships).
150. Id. at 196 n.8 ("Respondent does not defend the judgment below based on the Ninth
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause or the Eighth Amendment.").
151. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1988)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Due Process and Equal Protection].
152. "Conduct" refers to what a person does, while "status" refers to what a person is. See
Robinson v. State of California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that although states may
criminalize the "conduct" of using drugs, states may not criminalize a person's "status" as a
drug addict).
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protection focuses on the status of gays and lesbians as a group and the
fact that they are being treated differently from the majority of the
population. '53 As Professor Sunstein states: "The fact that the underlying
conduct can be criminalized is irrelevant to the [equal protection]
problem; it is always immaterial to an equal protection challenge that
members of the victimized group are engaging in conduct that could be
prohibited on a general basis."' 54 In other words, regardless of the
majority's opinion of the conduct generally engaged in by a certain group,
that group cannot be denied rights and privileges just because they are
members of that group.
In his Romer v. Evans dissent, Justice Scalia argues that the majority
ignored the holding of Bowers. 55 However, Scalia makes the mistake of
trying to apply the logic of Bowers, a substantive due process case, to an
equal protection problem. He states that "[i]f it is constitutionally
permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is
constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely
disfavoring homosexual conduct."156 Bowers held that the state may
lawfully criminalize sodomy,157 conduct which can be performed by
homosexual or heterosexual persons. On the other hand, Amendment 2
was directed towards outlawing any protections for persons of
homosexual status, and this type of status-based discrimination is not
permitted under the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Scalia's argument
above is premised on the truism that "the greater includes the lesser."
However, Scalia's conclusions in Romer do not logically flow from the
holding in Bowers because Bowers did not decide anything about the
constitutionality of laws that affect homosexual status.'58
153. See Sunstein, Due Process and Equal Protection, supra note 151, at 1163.
154. Id. at 1166.
155. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
156. Id. Like Justice Scalia, some lower courts have used Bower's validation of restrictions
on homosexual conduct to allow discrimination based on sexual orientation. See Padula v.
Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("If the [Bowers] Court was unwilling to object to
state laws that criminalize the behavior that defines the class, it is hardly open to a lower court
to conclude that state sponsored discrimination is invidious.").
157. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-88.
158. For a very interesting "logical" discussion of this point, see Lynn A. Baker, The
Missing Pages of the Majority Opinion in Romer v Evans, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 387, 389-99
(1997). Here is a particularly relevant excerpt:
[T]he relationship between Bowers and Romer, for example, might be understood in
terms of the following syllogism:
Major Premise: There is a category of persons-homosexuals-whose act of
sodomy the state has the power to criminalize (Bowers).
Minor Premise: Person X is a homosexual.
Conclusion A: Therefore the state has the power to sponsor discrimination
against person X (Romer); or
EQUAL PROTECTIONNovember 1997]
The Romer majority makes no mention whatsoever of Bowers, and
the plaintiff's lawyers "expressly disavowed any intent" to overrule the
decision.' 59  Despite this disclaimer, the Romer decision could be
interpreted as overruling Bowers sub silentio. To support this
proposition, it should be noted that Bowers has not been cited favorably
by the Court since the decision."6 Further, the Seventh Circuit has found
that Bowers "will soon be eclipsed in the area of equal protection by the
Supreme Court's holding in Romer v. Evans. 1 6  Regardless, gay and
lesbian advocates probably will not revive arguments that homosexuality
is a fundamental right under substantive due process principles, because
Romer has presented new opportunities under the Equal Protection
Clause.
D. The Significance of Romer v. Evans
Of course, predicting the future application of Supreme Court
decisions is prone to many pitfalls, especially predictions based on the
brief and cryptic majority opinion involved in Romer v. Evans. 62 In fact,
it is much easier to discuss what the Romer decision does not mean. The
Romer decision probably does not suggest that the Court will soon elevate
gays and lesbians to suspect class status. 6  Although the plaintiffs and
Conclusion B: Therefore the state has the power to prohibit all levels of
state government from bestowing special protections upon homosexual
conduct by Person X (Romer).
The conclusion that logically follows from the stated premises, however, is neither
Conclusion A nor Conclusion B but that "the state has the power to criminalize acts of
homosexual sodomy" by Person X. Indeed, Conclusion A and Conclusion B each
have a predicate different from that of the Major Premise: the "power to criminalize"
acts of homosexual sodomy is not identical with either "the power to sponsor
discrimination against" homosexuals or "the power to prohibit all levels of state
government from bestowing special protections upon homosexual conduct.
Id. at 393 (citations omitted).
159. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160. See George Steven Swan, The Political Economy of State Democracy: Romer v.
Evans, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1, 32 n.229 (1996) (noting that between 1986 and 1996, the
Supreme Court never cited approvingly the holding of Bowers). Perhaps the Court's reluctance
to cite Bowers is based in part on Justice Powell's public rejection of his vote to join the
majority in Bowers. See Linda Greenhouse, When Second Thoughts in Case Come Too Late,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1990, at A-14. Without his vote, the decision would have come out 5-4
in favor of striking sodomy laws as unconstitutional.
161. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 458 n.12 (7th Cir. 1996).
162. For an insightful essay by the Director of the ACLU's National Lesbian and Gay
Rights Project which considers the Romer decision and its future importance, see Matthew
Coles, The Meaning of Romer v. Evans, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1343 (1997).
163. Justice Scalia tries to inject his own reading into the majority opinion by claiming that
the Court impliedly rejected the argument that gays and lesbians constitute a suspect or quasi-
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amici in the litigation advanced this point in the Romer litigation,'64 Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion makes no mention of heightened scrutiny.
Further, none of the other justices in the majority took the time to write a
concurring opinion suggesting that gays and lesbians should be subject to
heightened scrutiny. Moreover, this particular Supreme Court is not
known for its judicial activism in expanding rights under the Equal
Protection Clause or under other constitutional provisions such as the Due
Process Clause.ts In short, no signals point towards the Court creating
any broad new constitutional protections for gays and lesbians.
There is disagreement even within the gay rights community about
the meaning of Romer. " The most broad reading of the case suggests
that the Court will strike down any laws that "seek to withdraw legal
rights from a targeted group."167 Perhaps this reading squeezes too much
from Romer's minimal opinion.168 In any event, Romer v. Evans suggests
that the harshness of the Bowers v. Hardwick opinion will not again be
heard in a majority opinion from the Supreme Court. Romer does not
overrule the narrow holding of Bowers, that the conduct of homosexual
sodomy is not protected as a fundamental right. However, Romer's
importance is that the Court now recognizes gays and lesbians as a
defined group. Under Justice Scalia's view, gays and lesbians are not a
group but rather are distinct individuals who engage in conduct that is not
protected. 169 Since the conduct that "defines" the group can be
prohibited, the group is entitled to no protection. The Romer majority
suspect class. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, the issue was
not briefed in the Supreme Court litigation and it was not considered by the Court.
164. See Brief of Human Rights Campaign Fund et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 3-5, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No. 94-1039).
165. On the other hand, the Court has been very active in opening courts to individuals or
groups who challenge affirmative action plans using equal protection principles. See Adarand
Constructors v. Penn, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that strict scrutiny applies to all
governmental measures classifying persons on the basis of race, even affirmative action
measures); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that a city set-
aside program for minority businesses fails the strict scrutiny standard under the Equal
Protection Clause).
166. See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Gay Rights Ruling Short on Guidance: Broad Language
Leaves Opinion Open to Interpretation, CHI. TRIB., May 22, 1996, at 4 ("Even gay rights
groups view the opinion differently."). Compare Wolff, supra note 94 (arguing that the opinion
foreshadows heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation classifications) with Coles, supra note
162 (suggesting a much less expansive view of Romer).
167. Guillerman, supra note 8, at 467 (quoting Evan Wolfson, Counsel for Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund).
168. See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 203, 221 (1996) (noting that Justice Kennedy's opinion was "short and sweet, with noble
words and no foomotes" and "relatively free of formulaic doctrinal jargon").
169. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that since all
homosexual individuals take part in homosexual conduct, Bowers v. Hardwick controls and
Amendment 2 is constitutional).
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implicitly recognized something else-that gays and lesbians are more
than just individuals committing conduct that can be outlawed. Although
gays and lesbians as a group may not be entitled to heightened scrutiny,
they will at least be protected by rational basis review. Legislation that is
motivated by homophobia or prejudice will not survive this review.
Because gays and lesbians are recognized as a group, any laws negatively
impacting them must at least display some minimal level of rationality.
Romer's direct effect is to make clear that legislation that is motivated by
nothing more than hatred towards or extreme prejudice against gays and
lesbians is not rational and therefore not constitutional.
IV. The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
This brings the discussion to the particular implications of the Romer
decision for the DOMA. Under the most narrow holding of the Romer
decision, this legislation must meet rational basis scrutiny-that is, it must
be motivated by more than "animus" towards gays and lesbians. 170
A. Description of the DOMA
The DOMA was passed by the 104th Congress in September of
1996. Its two significant provisions are contained in Sections 2 and 3.
Section 3, which is the focus of this Note, defines marriage for the
purposes of federal law to be "a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife" and defines a spouse as "a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."'.7 1 This Section is intended to
prevent same-sex couples from qualifying for the many federal rights and
benefits that opposite-sex couples now qualify for. It could have real
impact for same-sex couples who would not get favorable tax treatment,
property rights, social security benefits such as survivor benefits, and
other spousal rights and benefits that opposite-sex couples are
automatically granted."
170. See supra Part III.A.
171. Defense of Marriage Act, § 3, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C & 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996)).
172. See Baehr 1, 852 P.2d at 59 (noting the advantages of legalized marriage); David L.
Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and
Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447 (1996) (discussing the many economic and other
benefits of legalized marriage); Guillerman, supra note 8, at 434 (same).
Tax and inheritance benefits for opposite sex-couples can be significant. Same-sex couples
cannot file joint tax returns, and if one partner dies, the survivor cannot exempt a substantial
portion of his or her inheritance from taxation as can a legal spouse. Further, benefits provided
to partners of lesbian and gay employees under domestic partner benefit plans is considered
taxable income of the employee, while benefits provided to spouses are excludable from taxable
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For example, under federal immigration laws, a foreign-born
national who enters into a nonfraudulent marriage with an American
citizen has a presumptive right to enter the United States as a long-term
resident. 73 The DOMA would prevent same-sex couples from gaining
this benefit, since a "married" couple under federal law must be
comprised of a man and a woman. Another federal law, the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993, requires employers to give twelve weeks of
unpaid leave to employees for the purpose of taking care of a spouse with
a "serious health condition." 74 Because of the DOMA, same-sex couples
would not be entitled to this benefit either. Further, federal law bars the
government from forcing a married person to testify against his or her
spouse in a criminal proceeding." Same-sex couples would not be
entitled to this protection because of the DOMA. Clearly, marriage
provides numerous benefits beyond favorable tax treatment to those who
qualify.
Section 2 is not as easily explained. The provisions of Section 2
provide that:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship. 1 6
This provision allows states to "opt-out" of recognizing same-sex
marriages performed in other states, anticipating that same-sex marriages
could soon be legalized in Hawaii. Under traditional choice of law rules,
states give full effect to marriages performed in other states, with some
limited exceptions."n The backers of the DOMA were worried that the
other forty-nine states would be forced by the Full Faith and Credit
income of the employee. See generally Patricia Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax
Laws, 1 LAw & SEXUALrrY. 97 (1991).
173. See 2 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 36.02
(1996).
174. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611-54, 2612(a)(1)(c) (1994).
175. See KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 66 (John William
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
176. Defense of Marriage Act, § 2.
177. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1969) (stating that a
marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will be
recognized as valid in all other states as long as the marriage does not violate a strong public
policy of the other states); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 121 (1934) (stating that
except for two instances, "a marriage is valid everywhere if the requirements of the marriage
law of the state where the contract of marriage takes place are complied with"). Sometimes
states will recognize marriages contracted elsewhere even if they \would have been void had they
been contracted in the domicile. See, e.g., In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 7 (N.Y. 1953);
Horton v. Horton, 198 P. 1105, 1106 (Ariz. 1921).
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Clause of the U.S. Constitution to recognize marriages performed in
Hawaii. 7 ' This Clause provides that: "[flull faith and credit shall be
given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of
every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the
manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and
the effect thereof." 
179
Although there is little precedent addressing this Clause,180 the
backers of the DOMA believe that the second sentence of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause allows Congress to provide exceptions to the general
principle that states must recognize marriages performed in other states.
It is important to note that Section 2 of the DOMA does not prohibit any
state from recognizing same-sex marriages if it so desires; it merely
allows states to choose whether to recognize them. Many constitutional
scholars believe that the states already have this power to refuse to
recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states, since various
states have exceptions for some marriages performed in other states.'' If
so, then Section 2 is merely redundant. The constitutionality of Section 2
is beyond the scope of this Note and is not considered because its
constitutionality will probably be determined by examining the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, not the Equal Protection Clause.
B. Does Section 3 of the DOMA Survive the Rational Basis Test
After Romer?
Section 3 of the DOMA facially discriminates against gays and
lesbians because it denies federal benefits and protections to same-sex
couples although these rights are extended to opposite sex couples. Gays
and lesbians who are allowed to marry in Hawaii or any other state will
not be considered "married" under federal law. Section 3 would result in
a same-sex couple being treated very differently from an opposite-sex
couple, even though both couples would have the same legal recognition
under Hawaii law. This would result in same-sex couples who would not
be entitled to many federal tax law benefits, inheritance protections, and
other rights that are accorded to opposite-sex couples. 1
82
178. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I.
179. Id.
180. The interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is beyond the scope of this Note.
For the purposes of this Note, it is enough to assume that the Clause allows Congress the
flexibility to enact the DOMA.
181. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 37 (1996) (noting that those opposed to DOMA,
including some constitutional scholars, think that the law is irrelevant since states can already
deny recognition to marriages of which they disapprove).
182. For a discussion of the many benefits accorded couples married under federal law, see
supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
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As noted in the House Judiciary Committee's Report on the DOMA,
"The word 'marriage' appears in more than 800 sections of federal
statutes and regulations, and the word 'spouse' appears more than 3,100
times."183 Under this section of the DOMA, "a Hawaii [same-sex] couple
sitting in their living room with their children playing at their feet are
married when they file their joint state tax form and forcibly unmarried
when they file their federal income tax forms."" To take a different
example, one member of an opposite-sex elderly couple in Hawaii would
be entitled to federal social security benefits if his or her partner dies,
while a similarly situated same-sex surviving spouse would not qualify for
social security benefits. "  Because this legislation facially discriminates,
it must at least satisfy some form of minimal rational basis scrutiny.
Under Romer's rational basis test, the legislation must be motivated by
more than "animus" and have a legitimate purpose.186
In order to fully consider whether the DOMA was motivated by a
legitimate purpose, we must look at each reason given by Congress for
the law. The House Committee Report suggests that the bill is a "modest
effort" to fight the "orchestrated legal campaign by homosexual groups to
redefine the institution of marriage through the judicial process."1 The
Report sets forth three governmental interests underlying the legislation:
"(1) defending and nurturing the institution of traditional, heterosexual
marriage; (2) defending traditional notions of morality;.., and [(3)]
preserving scarce governmental resources."188 These governmental
interests will be considered individually.
(1) Defending and Nurturing the Institution of Traditional Heterosexual
Marriage
Congressional supporters place great weight on this interest, the idea
that the DOMA somehow defends the institution of "heterosexual" 189 or
183. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 10 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2914.
184. Tom Curley, Hawaii Gay Marriage Case Has National Implications, USA TODAY,
Dec. 5, 1996 at 4A (quoting Evan Wolfson, witness who testified against the DOMA in
Congressional hearings).
185. See Chambers, supra note 172, at 474.
186. See supra Part IMl.A.
187. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 12.
188. Id. The Report also shows that the Congress enacted the DOMA to protect state
sovereignty and democratic self-governance. This interest is not considered in this Note because
it really applies to Section 2 of the DOMA rather than Section 3. See id.
189. "Heterosexual" marriage is not the most appropriate term for a marriage between a
woman and a man. A gay man could marry a heterosexual woman and the marriage would be
valid, although it would not be a "heterosexual" marriage. Similarly, one could consider
combinations of a lesbian woman marrying a heterosexual man, or a gay man marrying a lesbian
woman. This is why I use the term opposite-sex marriage to describe the "legal union between
one man and one woman."
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opposite-sex marriage. This argument begins by recognizing that the
institution of opposite-sex marriage is an historical tradition that is
beneficial, and is found prominently in every ancient and modem
society."9 The DOMA advocates claim that marriage is not founded on
romantic love between the two persons involved, but rather is founded on
the idea that only one man and one woman can create a child. "Were it
not for the possibility of begetting children inherent in heterosexual
unions, society would have no particular interest in encouraging citizens
to come together in a committed relationship."191 Next, the DOMA
supporters fling curses at divorce and unwed parenthood, claiming that
"[t]he time has come to shift the focus of national attention from divorce
to marriage."" The idea here is that the institution of opposite-sex
marriage is already under "attack" by divorce and single parenthood (and
by implication homosexuality) and that the institution would be further
weakened if same-sex couples were allowed legal recognition.1
93
First, the argument that the institution of marriage is solely for
procreation is a frivolous notion 94 and would certainly offend opposite-
sex couples who married with no intention of having children. There is
no necessary link between marriage, procreation, and child-rearing." Of
course, many opposite-sex couples do marry to bear and raise children,
but some do not. At the same time, many opposite-sex couples conceive
and raise children without marrying. Moreover, many opposite-sex
couples marry well past the age of childbearing. Would the Congress
190. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 12-14.
191. Id. at 14.
192. Id. at 15 (quoting the Council on Families, without citation).
193. Historian John Boswell recounts a visit from a priest while Boswell was preparing his
book, Same-Sex Unions in Premodern Europe. The priest remarked that opposite-sex marriage
was such a "ragged institution in the second half of the twentieth century" that same-sex couples
should not aspire to its weakness but should devise something entirely new. JOHN BOSWELL,
SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE 281 (1994). Gay leaders often debate this point.
See ESKRIDGE, THE CASE, supra note 44, at 51-62 (1996) (describing the debate within the
lesbian and gay community about whether same-sex marriage is a desirable goal). For two
articles that represent both sides of the debate, see Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We
Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of
Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REv. 1535 (1993) (arguing that legalizing same-sex
marriage actually would reinforce gender inequality) and Evan Wolfson, Crossing the
Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men, and the Intra-Community
Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 567 (1994-95) (responding to Professor
Polikoff).
194. Carried to its logical extreme, if procreation is the chief goal of marriage, then
polygamous marriages and adultery should be encouraged in order to conceive the maximum
number of children.
195. See ESKRIDGE, THE CASE, supra note 44, at 96-98 (noting that sterile opposite-sex
couples may marry and adopt children, even though they are physically incapable of
procreating).
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argue that because these couples cannot or do not intend to bear children,
they should be denied the right to marry or the right to federal benefits?
That type of legislation surely would not survive rational basis scrutiny.196
Therefore, the position that opposite-sex marriage should be "protected"
because the state must protect procreation is largely without merit."9
Even if one accepts the argument that marriage is based on child-
rearing, evidence suggests that same-sex couples make fitting parents. 9
Many DOMA supporters might claim that this is an absurd argument
because same-sex couples cannot produce children through copulation.
However, same-sex couples are adopting more children and are finding
creative methods of "naturally" creating children as well through
alternative reproductive techniques."9 Prohibiting same-sex marriage is
actually anti-family and detrimental to the children of lesbian and gay
parents in denying them the benefit of having two state-recognized
parents." Also, many gays and lesbians raise children conceived from
prior relationships with persons of the opposite sex. A 1992 survey
estimated that there were eight million gay and lesbian parents." Despite
what the DOMA supporters might believe, gay and lesbian parents are a
reality and the DOMA will do nothing to alter that reality. Furthermore,
the prohibition on same-sex marriages may in fact discourage procreation
because same-sex couples may elect not to have children because their
relationship is not formally blessed by the state. 202
196. See Marks v. Marks, 77 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270-71 (Kings County Sup. Ct. 1948) (holding
that an inability to procreate cannot be grounds for preventing people from marrying).
197. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 46, at 98 (arguing that because
the state cannot force married persons to have children under Supreme Court holdings in
substantive due process cases, neither can the state forbid people from marrying because they are
unable to bear children).
198. In the most comprehensive survey of the existing social science studies on child
development in lesbian and gay families, Charlotte Patterson found no evidence to suggest any
disadvantages for such children. See Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay
Parents: Summary of Research Findings, in LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTING: A RESOURCE FOR
PSYCHOLOGISTS (1995), reprinted in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 240-45 (Andrew
Sullivan ed., 1997). Patterson's review of the research specifically finds no evidence for the
three assumptions that development of children's sexual identity might be impaired, children's
personal development could be retarded, and that these children could experience difficulty in
social relationships. Id. But see Philip A. Belcastro et al., A Review of Data Based on Studies
Addressing the Effects of Homosexual Parenting on Children's Sexual and Social Functioning,
20 J. DIvORCE & REMARRIAGE (1993), reprinted in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON,
supra, at 250-56 (arguing that most social science studies in this area are essentially useless,
ruined by a lack of external validity and the biases of their authors).
199. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 46, at 138-42.
200. Baehr 17, 1996 WL 694235 at *17-18.
201. William E. Adams, Jr., Whose Family is it Anyway? The Continuing Struggle for
Lesbians and Gay Men Seeking to Adopt Children, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 579, 581 (1996).
202. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 46, at 100 (noting that
prohibitions on same-sex marriage may discourage same-sex couples from having children).
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The claim that marriage is under "attack" and will only be further
weakened by allowing same-sex marriages is similar to a white
supremacist's argument against interracial marriage. During the time
when anti-miscegenation statutes were in force in Southern states, white
supremacists feared that interracial marriage would lead to the erosion of
white prominence in society. 0 3 The fear that same-sex marriages would
weaken heterosexual dominance in society is similar. Both the white
supremacists and the DOMA supporters predict the destruction of a
traditional social institution, with little facts to back up their prediction.'
It is more likely that divorce, adultery, and child and spousal abuse have
contributed to any decline in the number and quality of opposite-sex
marriages. Just as interracial couples have been beneficial to the
institution of marriage by adding caring, compassionate couples to the
married ranks, same-sex couples would also improve the institution of
marriage. Giving legal recognition to same-sex marriages would
probably add to the total number of sanctioned marriages in the country
rather than subtracting from the number of opposite-sex marriages. Many
believe that allowing same-sex unions would bring responsibilities as well
as rights, because legally sanctioned relationships would contribute to
longer-term commitments between same-sex couples. 2 5 This result is
good for both the individuals and society, especially in the time of the
AIDS crisis.
Is this government interest in defending the institution of traditional,
opposite-sex marriage rational? In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court
struck down the anti-miscegenation statute because there was no purpose
behind the legislation other than irrational discrimination. 20 6 Because the
"protection of the heterosexual marriage" reasons advanced by the
DOMA supporters have been exposed as motivated by a similar
discrimination against gays and lesbians, this government interest surely
has no rational basis either. It is purely motivated by "animus" towards
gays and lesbians and is not a legitimate purpose for the legislation.
203. See ROBERT J. SICKELS, RACE, MARRIAGE AND THE LAw 34-42 (1972). One of the
Ku Klux Klan publications, entitled "Fifty Reason Why You Should Be a Member of the
Original Ku Klux Klan," included several reasons why they opposed interracial marriages, such
as "protecting womanhood" and "maintain[ing] forever the God-given supremacy of the White
race." Id. at 37.
204. Interestingly, the statute involved in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, (1967) began with
the words "An Act to Preserve Racial Integrity," id. at 11 n. 11. The DOMA begins with the
words "An act to define and preserve the institution of marriage." See Defense of Marriage
Act, Introduction.
205. See ESKRIDGE, THE CASE, supra note 44, at 70-74.
206. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12. Loving involved a racial classification and was thus subject
to strict scrutiny. The opinion, however, discounts the purposes behind anti-miscegenation laws
as prejudicial as well. Id.
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Under minimal rational basis review and the principles of Romer v.
Evans, legislation cannot be motivated by an illegitimate purpose.
(2) Defending Traditional Notions of Morality
The DOMA supporters also claim that the law protects the notions of
morality held by a majority of the public.' 7 Indeed, polls indicate that the
majority of Americans oppose the legal recognition of same-sex
marriage." The DOMA supporters' most forceful argument here is that
marriage, although civil in nature when sanctioned by the state, has a
religious meaning as well. Because, in their opinion, Judeo-Christian
religions disapprove of homosexuality, the state can sanction this
disapproval by prohibiting same-sex unions.' "It is both inevitable and
entirely appropriate that the law should reflect such moral judgments.
[The DOMA] serves the government's legitimate interest in protecting the
traditional moral teachings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage
laws."21 This argument contains at least two motivations-the idea that
homosexuality is unnatural and the related worry that homosexuality may
"spread" if it is sanctioned by the state.211
The argument that homosexuality is unnatural should be examined
through the lens of history. Throughout time, from ancient Greece to the
present, homosexuality has been a part of society.2 2 Many historians
207. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 15-16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,
2919-20. Advocates of such views claim that:
The most threatening aspect of homosexuality is its potential to become a viable
alternative to heterosexual intimacy.... This state concern should not be minimized.
The nuclear, heterosexual family is charged with several of society's most essential
functions.... []f allegiance to traditional family arrangements declines, society as a
whole [may] suffer."
J. Hame Wilkinson & G. Edward White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62
CORNELL L. REv. 563, 595 (1977).
208. See Jennifer Loven, Poll Finds Most Americans Opposed to Same-Sex Marriages,
Assoc. Press Pol. Service, Apr. 19, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5378186 (reporting that in a
nationwide poll, 57% of respondents opposed sanctioning same-sex marriages in their own states
while 33% of respondents supported such marriage).
209. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
210. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 16.
211. Curiously, the DOMA supporters worry that homosexuality may become a competitive
alternative to heterosexuality, as if otherwise happy heterosexuals would rush to marry members
of the same sex if it were legal. Such a result hardly seems likely. After all, under current
marriage law, friends can marry friends as long as they are of the opposite sex. However, it is
doubtful that many individuals enter into the institution of marriage lightly in this way.
212. See generally, BOSWELL, supra note 193, at xix ("Very few premodern or
nonindustrialized contemporary cultures would agree with the contention-uncontroversial in the
West-that 'the purpose of a man is to love a woman, and the purpose of a woman is to love a
man.' Most human beings in most times and places would find this a very meager measure of
human value.").
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have documented the proliferate same-sex eroticism in ancient Greece,
which even related same-sex relationships to democracy and military
valor.213 A noted historian, Yale professor John Boswell, has documented
formal same-sex unions that took place during ancient Roman times as
well.214 According to him, the Roman emperor Nero married a man in a
very public ceremony with a dowry and veil and lived with him as his
spouse.215 Further, there is no explicit prohibition on same-sex marriage
in the Old or New Testament, contrary to what many critics of same-sex
marriage claim. 216  Professor Boswell has also found that same-sex
marriages were performed by the Christian church in premodern Europe
as late as the sixteenth century.2"7 It is therefore a valid argument that
Judeo-Christianity has not always disapproved of same-sex marriages as
the DOMA supporters claim; in fact, Christian churches may have
formerly sanctioned them.
As Professor William Eskridge describes in his article, A History of
Same-Sex Marriage:
If one read only legal materials, one would think same-sex marriage an
historical and cultural oddity, if not freakish and perverse. Yet
historians, social anthropologists, and scholars of comparative literature
have been writing about same-sex marriage for most of this
century .... Same-sex unions ground upon affection, sexual
attractions, or a mixture thereof are commonplace in human
history ....2
The DOMA, in barring same-sex couples from receiving federal
government recognition, is not a legitimate vehicle to achieve the ends of
promoting historical notions of morality-such notions do not necessarily
condemn or even discourage same-sex matrimony. In fact, it is
questionable that anti-gay animus disguised as "morality" -may serve as a
legitimate motivation for a law such as the DOMA.219
213. Id. at 53-65.
214. Id. at 80.
215. Id. Nero was widely considered to be insane, so perhaps he is not the best role model
for the argument that same-sex marriage was not unusual and was uncontroversial. However,
many other prominent men in ancient Rome married other men with the sanction of the state.
See id.
216. ESKRIDGE, THE CASE, supra note 44, at 99-100.
217. BOSWELL, supra note 193, at 218-65.
218. William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419,
1435 (1993) [hereinafter Eskridge, History].
219. Justice Scalia opines in dissent that moral disapproval of homosexuality should be
enough to sustain Colorado's Amendment 2. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Although the majority does not mention the rejection of morality as a
legitimate reason, it may have implicitly rejected this as a rationale through its decision. See
Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1436-37 (9th Cir. 1997) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Romer majority implicitly rejected Justice Scalia's argument on this point because
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Again, this governmental interest can be compared to the irrational
prejudices present in anti-miscegenation laws and invalidated in Loving v.
Virginia. White supremacists claimed that granting legal recognition to
interracial marriages would impair the ability of the white race to advance
the goals of society.' They felt that interracial marriage was an
unnatural abomination and that allowing it would lead to the destruction
or "mongrelization" of the white race. 21 This argument that interracial
marriage is morally unnatural was rejected in Loving v. Virginia as an
illegitimate purpose.tm  Like prejudice against interracial marriage,
prejudice against same-sex marriage is irrational and based on the fear of
diversity and of people who are different. As such, neither are legitimate
because the advocates can show no possible harm from allowing
alternative unions; rather, they can only put forth the hollow claim that "it
ain't right."
The worry that homosexuality may "spread" is also erroneous and is
not a legitimate governmental interest. This argument rests on the
assumption that people "choose" to. be gay- or lesbian, and that
encouraging homosexuality will entice others to choose to become
homosexual. Recent scientific studies suggest that homosexuality is
hereditary and is possibly determined by a single gene.' Regardless of
its cause, homosexuality is no more a "choice" than is heterosexuality.
Any fear of it "spreading" due to the legalization of same-sex marriage is
based on the flawed assumption that gays and lesbians can choose the
gender they prefer. Although federal recognition of same-sex marriages
for benefit purposes might persuade many gays and lesbians to marry, 4
"[oltherwise, discrimination against an unpopular class could always be justified by reference to
the moral disapproval of the majority").
220. In a House debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1875, Kentucky Representative William
B. Read argued:
Now, what does all this mean but mixed schools and perfect social equality? It is
nothing more or less; and the next step will be that they will demand a law allowing
them, without restraint, to visit the parlors and drawing-rooms of the whites, and have
free and unrestrained social intercourse with your unmarried sons and daughters. It is
bound to come to that-there is no disguising the fact; and the sooner the alarm is
given and the people take heed the better it will be for our civilization.
Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Intent, 52
VA. L. REv. 1224, 1250 (1966) (quoting Rep. Read).
221. See Trosino, supra note 14, at 100 (describing white supremacist ideology).
222. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
223. See Alissa Freidman, The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage:
Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 134,
165-66 (1987) (noting that law has little or no effect on sexual orientation because it is
determined by age five or six); Zamansky, supra note 121, at 241-44 (discussing scientific
evidence about the idea that homosexual orientation is a trait which is evident early in life, is not
freely chosen, and cannot be changed).
224. Recent polls of gays and lesbians have shown that over 80% of them would marry if
legally able to do so. See Wolfson, supra note 193, at 583 (noting two separate polls, one
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this should not be viewed as a negative result. Instead, same-sex
marriage could create the possibility for many happy new marriages and
the end to gays and lesbians forcing themselves into opposite-sex
marriages in order to be "normal."'
Of course, there is also the issue advanced by some gay rights
opponents that children of gay and lesbian parents might also turn out to
be homosexual because they would be raised to be gay. There is no
empirical support for this proposition; children of gay and lesbian parents
are no more likely to be gay than the general population.2 6 Just as the
white supremacist argued that interracial marriages produced inferior
offspring, 7 the DOMA supporters claim that sanctioning same-sex
marriages could lead to more homosexuals. This rationale was
insupportable in Loving v. Virginia and is also insupportable when applied
to gays and lesbians and the DOMA.
(3) Preserving Scarce Governmental Resources
Section 3 of the DOMA would indeed protect the federal treasury
from any claim to federal benefits by same-sex couples. Although no
estimates have been made of the cost of federally recognizing same-sex
marriages, there are reasons to believe that the total cost would be small.
For example, some companies now offer same-sex couples health
insurance as part of domestic partner benefit packages. Although the total
workforce of the company is eligible for such benefits, only one percent
of employees elect to receive them." Also, existing studies of domestic
completed as recently as 1994 by the Advocate, a leading gay men's magazine). "Gays and
lesbians are raised in the same culture as everyone else. When they settle down they want gold
bands, they want legal documents, they want kids." Id.
225. See Andrew Sullivan, Here Comes the Groom: A (Conservative) Case for Gay
Marriage, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 28, 1989, at 20, 22 (arguing that legalization of same-sex
marriage could end pressure on gays and lesbians to "conform" and marry members of the
opposite sex); but see ESKRIDGE, THE CASE, supra note 44, at 138-39 (positing that there is no
evidence that gays who cannot marry turn to opposite-sex partners simply to conform to societal
pressure to marry).
226. See Patterson, supra note 198, at 243-44 (noting 13 studies that, when taken together,
do not suggest elevated rates of homosexuality among offspring of lesbian and gay parents).
227. Virginia's Racial Integrity Act of 1924 "forbade miscegenation on the grounds that
racial mixing was scientifically unsound and would 'pollute' America with mixed-blood
offspring." VA. CODE § 20-54 (1960 Rep. Vol.), quoted in Paul A. Lombardo, Miscegenation,
Eugenics, and Racism: Historical Footnotes to Loving v. Virginia, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
421, 423 (1988).
228. See ESKRIDGE, THE CASE, supra note 44, at 119 (noting that municipalities adopting
domestic partnership coverage found that the coverage added one to two percent or virtually
nothing to their total insurance costs). For the most comprehensive study of the costs to
government of business from adding domestic partner benefits, see HEWrrT ASSOCIATES,
DOMESTIC PARTNERS AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS (1991).
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partner programs show that, on average, same-sex couples are less
expensive for health care plans than are opposite-sex couples.2 9
Moreover, whatever new costs the federal government would incur
from granting same-sex couples certain benefits may be offset by
additional tax revenues resulting from tax savings in other areas. For
,example, when one member of a same-sex couple now applies for
financial aid for higher education, that person is not required to report his
or her partner's income as spousal income because only opposite-sex
couples are considered married. If that same-sex couple were recognized
as married by the federal government, both partners' incomes would have
to be reported when one member applied for aid.Y0  Because of this
additional reported income, the government would not distribute as much
grant or loan money to the student. In this way, the federal government
could actually save some money by recognizing same-sex marriages.
Many other government programs operate similarly. For example,
married individuals who are aged, blind, or disabled qualify for lower
Supplemental Security Income benefits than do similar single
individuals.3 Marriage may also increase a person's federal income,
gift, or estate taxes, depending on the situation. 2  As a result of
recognizing same-sex couples, then, it is not entirely clear that the
government would have to expend a great deal of money, and it is even
possible that the federal government could offset those expenditures with
new federal tax revenues gained by recognizing same-sex marriages 33
Even if granting benefits to same-sex partners would increase
government expenditures in some minor way, an important Supreme
Court case suggests that withdrawing federal money from an otherwise
deserving group of people based on irrational prejudice is
unconstitutional. In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
Congress amended 'the Food Stamp Act in 1971 to exclude benefits for
any household whose members are not related to each other."
Legislative history suggested that Congress passed the law to avoid paying
benefits to "hippies" and "hippie communes." 5  Using rational basis
229. ESKRIDGE, THE CASE, supra note 44, at 119 (discussing that employers have found
that the cost per employee of domestic partnership coverage is "substantially" lower than the
cost for spousal coverage).
230. See Chambers, supra note 172, at 473.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 473-75.
233. See id. at 475 (noting that it is possible that a higher proportion of gay and lesbian
couples would be disadvantaged if forted to file joint tax returns). If these same sex couples
were "disadvantaged" by tax laws, it must mean that the government is "advantaged" by gaining
additional tax revenues.
234. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 529-30 (1973). Moreno is
also discussed in Part ILI.B, supra, as an example of unconstitutional caste legislation.
235. Id. at 534.
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review, the Court struck down the law as violating the Equal Protection
Clause, stating that although "[p]roblems of the fise . .. are legitimate
concerns of government.... [The] government 'may not accomplish
such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its
citizens.'" 236
From Moreno comes the oft-repeated quote in Romer v. Evans that
"if the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest. "" Because the other government interests in
support of the DOMA have been shown to be motivated purely by
animosity, the DOMA fits squarely within the Moreno holding that the
Congress cannot prohibit a group from receiving federal benefits merely
because it dislikes that group. A Congressional action motivated by
nothing more than the desire to refuse granting benefits to gays and
lesbians is motivated by animus and should not survive rational basis
scrutiny.
V. Romer's Implications for Other Legislation
As some have suggested, Romer v. Evans may very well be the first
step on the road to recognizing gays and lesbians as a suspect class for
equal protection analysis. 38 However, Romer does not give any hints that
this step is imminent. At least for the near future, the federal and state
courts will have to struggle with Romer's rational basis holding. I think
that it is useful to think of three categories of legislation that might be
affected by the Romer decision. The first category of legislation is similar
to the situation of the Romer decision itself, where the government
discriminates against gays and lesbians without any legitimate interest.
The second category of legislation is where the government discriminates
against gays and lesbians and the legislation advances a government
purpose that may have some legitimacy, although this is contested by the
party challenging the law. The third category of cases is where the
classification discriminates against gays and lesbians but the government
truly has a legitimate purpose for the classification. As will be
developed, the first category is clearly unconstitutional, the second may
be unconstitutional, while the third classification is probably
constitutional.
236. Id. at 543 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969)).
237. Id. at 534.
238. See Wolff, supra note 94, at 250-52 (arguing that the Romer opinion foreshadows
future heightened scrutiny for anti-gay legislation).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
The third category of cases is easiest to discuss, because, of course,
not all legislation that negatively affects gays and lesbians is subject to
invalidity by the principles of equal protection law and Romer. One good
example of valid legislation affecting gays and lesbians is the municipal
actions taken by San Francisco, New York, and other large cities closing
gay bathhouses during the early days of the AIDS epidemic. 9  Once
scientists had concluded that the AIDS virus was spread through
unprotected sex, large cities decided to close gay bathhouses because of
the belief that AIDS was being spread by the large amount of unprotected
sex being committed on those premises. Some gay leaders opposed
closing the baths because they felt that heterosexuals were attacking an
institution that stood for the gay "lifestyle," but other gay leaders felt that
the closings were motivated by public health concerns rather than
discrimination.'
Obviously, the legislation. solely affected gays and lesbians.
However, this type of legislation was not motivated by bias or hatred for
gays, but rather was enacted for the legitimate purpose of protecting the
population from the spread of AIDS. This type of legislation was initiated
in gay-friendly cities that were not prone to irrational prejudice against
gays and lesbians, so therefore the laws were probably motivated by
legitimate concerns exclusive of discrimination. Although these laws
negatively affected or discriminated against some gays who wanted to go
to these bathhouses, this discrimination was for a legitimate state
interest-the health and safety of the population. This type of law is an
example of category three legislation that is clearly constitutional because
the governmental interests are legitimate, and the legislation is designed to
benefit the public as a whole rather than to prejudice a minority group
through the power struggle of interest group politics.
Category two legislation is the most problematic for courts to
examine. In these cases, the legislation is directed at gays and lesbians,
but the state advances a possibly meritorious governmental interest for the
law. A good example of this type of legislation is the current policy
against open gays and lesbians serving in the military, the "Don't
239. See RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON 436-49, 489-92 (1987) (discussing
the decisions made in 1984 by San Francisco, New York, and Los Angeles city officials to close
the bathhouses); Kenneth Vogel, Discrimination on the Basis of HJV Infection: An Economics
Analysis, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 965, 972-73 (1989) (noting the controversy surrounding closure of
the bathhouses). Some of the cities used legislative action to close the bathhouses, while others
took executive action through city health departments. See SHiLTs, supra at 436-49, 489-92.
240. See Mark S. Senak, The Lesbian and Gay Community, in AIDS AND THE LAW 290,
293-94 (H. Dalton ed., 1987) (discussing generally the controversy); SHILTS, supra note 239, at
440-44 (discussing how many gay leaders opposed closing the bathhouses for reasons of sexual
liberty); Vogel, supra note 239, at 972 (noting that gays felt that closure was symbolic of their
powerlessness in the larger community).
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Ask/Don't Tell" policy. 24' A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit recently
grappled with the inherent difficulties in dealing with this type of
legislation in Philips v. Perry.24a As an initial matter, the "Don't
Ask/Don't Tell" policy does not discriminate against gays and lesbians on
the basis of their sexual orientation, rather the Department of Defense
separates gays and lesbians if they engage in "homosexual acts" or if the
service member marries or tries to marry a person of the same sex.243
The Philips majority upheld the "Don't Ask/Don't Tell" policy
against an equal protection attack using rational basis review.2' The
court based its rationale on: 1) traditional court deference to military
policy; and 2) the legitimate governmental interest in maintaining an
effective armed forces through unit cohesion, accommodating personal
privacy, and reducing sexual tension. 245 Many courts that have examined
the "Don't Ask/Don't Tell" policy have been swayed by these
governmental interests, especially traditional deference to military
authorities.246 In dissent, Judge Betty Fletcher used the Romer rationale to
argue that the "Don't Ask/Don't Tell" policy cannot survive rational basis
247 areview. She alleged that the "legitimate" governmental interests
maintained by the military were only pretexts concealing purposeful
animosity toward gays and lesbians.248 In her view, the military was not
exempt from equal protection scrutiny, and she pointed to the danger of
courts abrogating their constitutional role of protecting minority groups in
the military context.249
Philips exhibits the potential conflicts in these sorts of cases after
Romer. First, what should a court do when confronted with governmental
purposes that may or may not be legitimate? In Philips, the government
admitted that it was discriminating against gays and lesbians, but its
rationale included the argument that military authorities have some beliefs
241. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994).
242. Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997).
243. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b).
244. Philips, 106 F.3d at 1429.
245. Id. at 1429.
246. See Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting
challenges to "Don't Ask/Don't Tell" policy based on equal protection and other grounds,
relying on Philips v. Perry); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
military policy does not violate the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component); Thomasson
v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (same). See also Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 217-19 (1944) (noting extreme deference to the military in certain situations).
247. See Philips, 106 F.3d at 1433-38 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 1433-36.
249. Id. at 1439-40. Judge Fletcher primarily points to Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944), where the Supreme Court upheld the internment of Japanese-Americans during
World War II based on deference to military authorities. This decision has been widely
criticized on many grounds.
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that it may be harmful to allow gays to serve openly.s ° Under traditional
rational basis review, the statute survives because the concerns may be
true, and the courts are reluctant to second-guess legislative judgments." 1
But these governmental interests may be merely based on prejudice as the
dissent in Philips points out. 52  If both arguments seem reasonable,
should courts defer to legislative judgment or should judges make their
own independent assessment? Romer has not resolved this problem, and
it, in fact, may have exacerbated it; thus the Supreme Court will need to
give further guidance in these situations.
Another problem with this particular case challenging the "Don't
Ask/Don't Tell" policy is that historically, judicial tradition suggests a
broad deference to military judgment. 3 Should this principle allow the
statute to withstand rational basis scrutiny even if the government interests
have been exposed as pretexts for prejudice? Courts will have a great
deal of trouble in these cases, and probably will err on the side of
upholding legislation in this area. Perhaps the inherent difficulty in
deciding these cases suggests that the Supreme Court should elevate
sexual orientation to a suspect class in order to allow more rigid scrutiny
of laws classifying by this trait.
A related problem for courts in category two legislation is detecting
when prejudice is disguised through pretextual government interests.
Under traditional principles of rational basis review, courts usually defer
to legislative judgment in cases where the government interest is arguably
valid.5 4 Courts must be careful not to be too deferential to legislatures in
cases in which the government interest is merely a pretext for
discrimination. If courts can find evidence that the legislation was
motivated by prejudice against gays and lesbians and the government
interest put forth has no real relation to the legislation, the courts should
find the legislation unconstitutional under Romer's principles. These
types of laws really do not fit into category two, but are better categorized
as category one laws where the government is attempting to disguise its
prejudice with improper purposes.
Category one cases, where the government discriminates against
gays without any legitimate interest, is also problematic but for different
reasons. Romer itself is the best example of this situation. The State of
Colorado was trying to strip discrimination protections from gays and
250. Philips, 106 F.3d at 1424.
251. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 15, at § 14.3.
252. Philips, 106 F.3d at 1433-36 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
253. See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-19 (arguing for deference to the military in the
context of World War II).
254. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 15, § 14.3 (noting that rational basis review
looks to whether the legislature arguably had a rational basis for the law).
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lesbians with very tenuous justifications. 5 In future category one cases,
the animus towards gays and lesbians will be more disguised and the
purposes behind the legislation will have to be scrutinized more carefully.
This Note has suggested that the DOMA is a case where the government
has no legitimate interest in denying federal benefits to married same-sex
couples. Opponents challenging this argument will argue that there are
legitimate government interests in keeping marriage exclusively between a
man and a women, mainly moral and ethical reasons. 6 It is difficult for
courts to tell the majority of the American public5 7 that these reasons are
not legitimate. However, if the "moral and ethical" reasons are merely
prejudice in disguise, then it is the duty of the courts to expose them as
such.
Based on the statute invalidated by Romer, the easiest type of
unconstitutional category one legislation to overturn should be initiatives
and other laws aimed at eliminating civil rights for gays and lesbians.
Colorado's Amendment 2 is a good example of these laws, which usually
attempt to restrict gays and lesbians from enacting anti-discrimination
legislation at the state and local level. One of these ordinances has been
under legal challenge in Cincinnati, Ohio since 19945' Similar to the
situation in Romer, the Cincinnati city charter was amended by an
initiative which prevented the city's various boards and commissions from
enacting any law, rule, or policy which provided any legal protections or
other preferential treatment for gays and lesbians.5 9  This charter
amendment was in part a response to a prior council ordinance which had
prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation.e6 Originally, the
Sixth Circuit had upheld this charter amendment as constitutional,
255. See supra Part III.A.
256. See supra Parts IV.B.1 and IV.B.2.
257. Polls have shown that over 50% of the U.S. population is opposed to same-sex
marriage. James D. Wilson, Gays Under Fire, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 14, 1992 at 34, 37. Note
that at the time that Loving v. Virginia invalidated anti-miscegenation statutes, 48% of the public
opposed mixed-race marriages. SIcKELs, supra note 203, at 117. Five years after the Loving
decision, this percentage had dropped to 35% opposing mixed-race marriages. Id. This
suggests that the public may eventually come to accept same-sex marriages over time, and that
the Court could spearhead this process by legalizing same-sex marriage. However, the Hawaii
experience suggests that this comparison may not be valid. By April of 1997, a constitutional
amendment banning same-sex marriage had been placed on the November 1998 ballot. See
supra note 6.
258. Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinatti, Inc. v. City of Cincinatti, 54 F.3d 261 (6th
Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Equality Foundation 1], vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996), upheld on
remand, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Equality Foundation Ill.
259. Equality Foundation 11, 128 F.3d at 291.
260. Id.
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however, the Supreme Court vacated this decision after it decided Romer
v. Evans.2'
The Supreme Court's action should have alerted the Sixth Circuit
that the Cincinnati ordinance, so similar to Amendment 2, probably does
not withstand constitutional scrutiny. However, on remand the Sixth
Circuit again found that the ordinance did not violate equal protection
despite its similarities to Amendment 2.2' This holding was based on two
supposed differences between the two laws. First, the Sixth Circuit held
that the Cincinnati amendment was not as broad as Amendment 2,
because it only aplied to a city while the Colorado Amendment applied
to an entire state. Second, the court held that the rational governmental
interests for the ordinance were to eliminate public costs of adjudicating
sexual orientation discrimination complaints and reducing the exposure of
the city to costly litigation. '
It seems to me that the Sixth Circuit has completely misinterpreted
Romer v. Evans. I will mostly skip discussion of the supposed difference
between the breadth of the two amendments, although it is interesting to
note that the two pieces of legislation look almost identical26 and perform
similar functions-both were enacted in a popular election to reverse
legislation that had been passed by legislatures to protect gays and
lesbians, and both prevent gays and lesbians from enacting protective
legislation except by constitutional or charter amendment. The fact that
one ordinance was enacted by a city and one was enacted by a state seems
to be a rather insignificant point.
For this Note, it is interesting to consider the city's purposes for
enacting the ordinance. The Sixth Circuit relies a great deal on the desire
to avoid the public costs of adjudicating discrimination complaints.66
This seems nearly identical to the governmental purpose invalidated in
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno-withdrawing
government benefits because Congress did not desire to pay benefits to an
unpopular group. 267 In the case of the Cincinnati ordinance, the city just
made a slightly different argument. Rather than withdrawing cash
benefits from gays and lesbians, it is attempting to avoid spending money
adjudicating discrimination complaints against them. The practical
implications of both Moreno and Equality Foundation are identical; the
government has withdrawn a right based on cost considerations.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 301.
263. Id. at 296-99.
264. Id. at 300.
265. Compare id. at 291 (setting forth the exact language of the Cincinatti ordinance) with
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623 (providing the language of Colorado's Amendment 2).
266. See Equality Foundation II, 128 F.3d at 300.
267. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
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Although the government may condition funding based on legitimate
purposes, it may not withdraw funding because it dislikes a certain
group.2'
One of the easiest cases that could be invalidated under Romer as
category one legislation would be a law that only prohibited homosexual
sodomy. There are no legitimate reasons for a statute of this kind, and
the Supreme Court did not foreclose an equal protection challenge to this
type of law in Bowers v. Hardwick.269 The statute in Bowers was directed
towards all acts of sodomy, whether between same-sex couples or
opposite-sex couples.27 As was noted in a previous section of this
Note, 271 these statutes have not been examined under the Equal Protection
Clause, and a statute aimed purely at same-sex sodomy would probably
not satisfy Romer's rational basis test because the state could not find a
legitimate purpose for selective enforcement of the law against gays and
lesbians.
One of the few potential legitimate purposes for such a law might be
some public health benefit, such as preventing the spread of AIDS. In a
recent Montana case successfully challenging a ban on homosexual
sodomy as unconstitutional, none of three state public health experts could
identify any public health purpose for such a law, 27 and the court
ultimately found that this argument is based on "faulty logic and invalid
assumptions about the disease.2' Indeed, heterosexual contact is
responsible for the fastest growth in AIDS incidence.274 Similar to this
Montana court, other courts have been unable to find any legitimate
purpose for statutes solely banning homosexual sodomy.275  Under
Romer's rational basis test, it seems likely that these laws cannot
withstand even the minimal rational basis scrutiny.
As the discussion of the DOMA, the Equality Foundation case, and
the sodomy laws shows, the real difficulty for courts in analyzing
category one laws is identifying whether a government interest is
legitimate or discriminatory. Traditionally, when examining an equal
protection problem, courts do not closely scrutinize the purposes behind
268. See United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 543 (1973).
269. See 478 U.S. 186, 196 n.8 (1986).
270. Id. at 187-88.
271. See supra Part III.C.
272. Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997) (Turnage, C.J., concurring and
dissenting) (noting the testimony of public health experts in the original trial). The majority in
Gryczan found that the ban on homosexual sodomy violated Montana's privacy right; however,
it is significant that the court found no compelling state interest in the few purposes for the law
put forth by the state.
273. Id. at 123.
274. See id. at 124 (citing most recent data provided by the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC)).
275. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 501 (Ky. 1992).
legislation, but rather they examine the means chosen by the government
to achieve those purposes, and balance the strength of the government
interest against individual rights.276 Passing judgment on the reasons why
the state has enacted legislation may be more problematic for courts,
because in a democracy it is generally for legislative branches to decide
what ends the government should pursue.2' However, certain purposes
are illegitimate because they are based on discrimination. For example,
consider laws banning same-sex marriage which have been enacted by
some state legislatures reacting to Baehr v. Lewin in Hawaii.278 Are these
bans based on illegitimate purposes and should they therefore be
overturned as unconstitutional?
These laws are similar to the DOMA in some respects. The
government interests supporting these bans on same-sex marriage are
similar to the reasons which motivated the DOMA, and these interests
could be characterized as the desire to harm a politically unpopular
group.279 On the other hand, marriage law is traditionally the province of
the states, and the Supreme Court may be reluctant to challenge these
restrictions out of concern for federalism. Nonetheless, similar
discriminatory restrictions were outlawed in Loving v. Virginia,"s so the
Court has precedent for such'a decision should it wish to extend the
Romer rationale to a ban on same-sex marriage.
It is easier to argue that the DOMA is unconstitutional because, in
order to challenge the DOMA, a same-sex couple must already have a
valid marriage license issued by a state, assumed to be Hawaii. If the
same-sex couple has a valid license, it is easier to see that there is little
federal interest in denying them the same benefits that would be granted
to opposite-sex couples with similar valid marriage licenses. If the Court
would hold that all bans on same-sex marriage violate the Equal
276. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAUIF. L.
REV. 297, 303-11 (1997). Professor Bhagwat argues that through cases such as Romer v.
Evans, the Court's jurisprudence has been moving towards more closely scrutinizing the
purposes behind governmental action and moving away from the "traditional" approach to
constitutional scrutiny.
277. See id. at 321. Reviewing the legislature's purpose and the problems presented by such
review is generally known as the "counter-majoritarian difficulty." Id. at 321 n.96 (citing
works such as Alexander Bickel's famous article, The Least Dangerous Branch, which coined
the term "counter-majoritarian difficulty").
278. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family
Recognition, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 107, 108 n.2 (1996) (noting that over 15 state legislatures across
the country have passed laws banning recognition of same-sex marriage, fearing that they might
be forced to recognize such marriages performed in Hawaii).
279. See supra Part IV.B. (detailing the governmental interests which motivated the
Congress to pass DOMA, and arguing that these reasons are motivated by animus and are
unconstitutional under Romer v. Evans).
280. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
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Protection Clause, this would be a profound restructuring of marital law
in all fifty states and the result would be much more controversial. Even
advocates of same-sex marriage argue that such a ruling would not be
prudent in the near future.28' Although doctrinally it may make sense for
the Court to invalidate such restrictions based on Romer and Loving, the
issue should probably be saved for the future. Incremental reform for
gays and lesbians in the equal protection area is more palatable to the
public and is probably more likely to achieve the advocates' ultimate goal
of invalidating bans on same-sex marriage."
Other laws that could possibly be invalidated as examples of category
one legislation might include laws that ban gays and lesbians from
adopting children, or laws favoring heterosexual parents in child custody
battles between a heterosexual and a homosexual parent. The
governmental interests that might be advanced in both cases are that
heterosexual environments are best for raising children. However, these
reasons could also be exposed as false-there is no empirical evidence to
support such claims. 3
Of course, not all legislation will fit into any one category. In fact,
the Supreme Court noted that the particular kind of legislation in Romer
was "unprecedented in our jurisprudence. ''284  However, most laws
prejudicial to gays and lesbians have no legitimate purpose other than hate
and prejudice. The examples above are certainly not exhaustive and are
merely given to show how Romer could be used to invalidate some
prejudicial laws. Gays and lesbians are one of the last groups that certain
majority groups try to disadvantage, and this Note has illustrated how, by
using Romer, courts can invalidate legislation that is particularly
offensive. Romer is the first step, but its rational basis principles may be
interpreted to invalidate some other types of legislation directed at gays
and lesbians. As cases evolve, courts may become more willing to
recognize discriminatory legislation and strike it down under Romer's
281. See Sunstein, Homosexuality, supra note 40, at 25-27 (arguing that such a ruling would
cause a constitutional crisis, a weakening of the Court's legitimacy, or a constitutional
amendment overturning the ruling).
282. Some gays and lesbians argue that legalization of same-sex marriage is not an
appropriate target for litigation because they find fault with the institution itself. See, e.g.,
Polikoff, supra note 193. I fundamentally disagree. First of all, the gay public clearly desires
the right to marry, as do most persons who desire to affirm their emotional relationships.
Nearly two-thirds of all gay men and lesbians in recent surveys indicated that they would marry
if legally able to do so. See Wolfson, supra note 193, at 583 (citing a 1994 poll conducted by
the Advocate, a gay men's magazine); Chambers, supra note 172, at 449-450 (citing a poll of
2,600 lesbians where 70% indicated that they would marry a woman if it was legal). Marriage
is simply an expression of a loving commitment that is universal, *not heterosexual or
homosexual.
283. See supra note 226.
284. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996).
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rational basis test. Whether courts do so will depend largely on how
closely they are willing to question a legislature's potentially prejudicial
motivations.
Conclusion
The Baehr v. Lewin decision in Hawaii was a seemingly
revolutionary moment. For the first time, a state supreme court
considered allowing same-sex marriages to have the same meaning as
opposite-sex marriages. In retrospect, however, the Romer v. Evans
decision, while less famous, may be more important for gays and lesbians
than Baehr v. Lewin. Although Romer is an enigmatic decision, its most
narrow holding is extremely important for gay and lesbian civil rights
litigation. In the Romer decision, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
that gays and lesbians cannot be prejudiced by legislation without any
rational basis. In reality, most prejudicial legislation is enacted without
any rational basis, so the Romer decision could have a lasting impact on
many types of laws that are discriminatory.
As a response to the Baehr decision in Hawaii, Congress passed the
DOMA, which would bar same-sex couples from receiving federal rights
and benefits that would ordinarily be afforded any opposite-sex couple
married in that same state. This Note has shown that the DOMA is an
example of legislation that cannot pass the Romer rational basis test. Its
motivations included the supposed governmental interests in defending
and nurturing the traditional institution of opposite-sex marriage,
defending traditional notions of morality, and preserving scarce
governmental resources. However, upon examination, these
"government interests" are easily exposed as facades for discrimination
against gays and lesbians, intended to preserve the status quo of opposite-
sex marriages only. The interests advanced by Congress to justify the
DOMA are very similar to the interests advanced by white supremacists
who supported anti-miscegenation statutes. These illegitimate purposes
were found to be irrational in Loving v. Virginia, and are insupportable
behind any other legislation such as the DOMA. Without any other
rational basis, the DOMA provision which defines marriage as the "union
of one man and one woman"' cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.
Beyond the DOMA, this Note has proposed that the equal protection
principles in Romer v. Evans may be used in other situations where laws
classify on the basis of sexual orientation. The most obvious application
of this principle is to laws similar to Amendment 2, which withdraw
certain civil rights protections for gays and lesbians. Another application
285. Defense of Marriage Act, § 3, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1738c & 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996)).
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of Romer could be to invalidate laws banning homosexual sodomy. In
addition, there may be innumerable other applications of Romer to other
laws; for example, to laws which prevent gays and lesbians from adopting
children or serving as foster parents. Future applications of Romer
rational basis review may be limited when the government interests
advanced have some legitimacy, and future cases will address the inherent
conflicts involved in these situations.
The Romer decision obviously is not the end of litigation challenging
homophobic and prejudicial legislation. It is, however, a good beginning.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized gays and lesbians as a group that
deserves protection, so the debate will now shift to how much protection
should be given to this new group. Perhaps the prognosticators are
correct that the Romer decision is just an intermediate step to recognizing
gays and lesbians as a suspect class. In any event, the courthouse doors
are now open to meritorious equal protection claims that may have
wrongly been assumed invalid as a result of Bowers v. Hardwick.
